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Judging Aggression
NOAH WEISBORD*

One of the most polarizing debates in international
law is how the goal of peace should figure into the
work of internationalcriminal tribunals. The freshly
minted crime of aggression lands the judges of the InternationalCriminal Court in the middle of the peace
versus justice dilemma and will challenge the court to
prove its value for advancing peace in appropriate
circumstances while building the rule of law and
maintaining its legitimacy. This Article, the final installment in the author's trilogy on the crime of aggression, explores the gaps, ambiguities and contradictions woven into the definition of the crime and
evaluates the range of ways in which well-intentioned
internationaljudges might attempt to do justice while
promoting peace through decisional law focusing on
three of internationallaw s' most controversial questions: the scope of self-defense, the status of humanitarian intervention under the UN Charter and the
character of an armed attack. Ultimately, this Article
argues for a richer understanding of the concepts of
peace andjustice that will permit internationaljudges
to punish aggressionwhile promotingpeace.
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INTRODUCTION

Two of the foremost controversies within the field of international criminal law are on a collision course: the definition of the
crime of aggression and the peace versus justice dilemma. When
these controversies collide, the judges of the International Criminal
Court ("ICC") will be expected to mediate the impact. Punishing aggression while promoting peace will be a herculean task if ever there
was one.
In June 2010, in Kampala, the Assembly of States Parties
("ASP") to the ICC successfully negotiated a consensus definition of
the crime of aggression as well as jurisdictional conditions and a
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mechanism for the amendments to the ICC Statute to enter into
force.1 These amendments will give the ICC jurisdiction to prosecute
political and military leaders of states for planning, preparing, initiating or executing illegal wars. The elements of an illegal war and the
doctrinal link that will allow a judge to attribute it to an individual
are circumscribed by the definition of the crime.
The Kampala outcome is the culmination of approximately
seventy years of on-and-off multilateral negotiations that gained
momentum after the Cold War.2 The ICC and the crime of aggression are legacies of the Nuremberg Trials whose evolution was obstructed by the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United
States. 3 Both court and crime became live issues again in the 1990s
with the end of the Cold War.4 The ICC Statute was created in 1998,
and the crime of aggression, the most contentious topic at the diplomatic conference establishing it, was included alongside genocide,
crimes against humanity and war crimes, but left undefined. 5 The
1998 diplomatic conference in Rome (the "Rome Conference") instead assigned a Preparatory Commission ("PrepCom") 6 to draft proposals to be considered at a future Review Conference, to be convened no earlier than seven years after the entry into force of the
Rome Statute. 7 This Review Conference took place in Kampala in
June 2010.
The negotiations over the crime of aggression gained unanticipated traction in 2002 when the PrepCom delegated the issue to a
1. Res. RC/Res.6, U.N. Doc. RC/Res.6 (June 11, 2010) [hereinafter Kampala
Outcome], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp-docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-

ENG.pdf (resolution adopting aggression amendments to the Rome Statute).
2.

For a compilation of key documents, see BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, DEFINING

INTERNATIONAL

AGGRESSION:

THE SEARCH FOR WORLD PEACE (1975);

for historical

accounts, see Noah Weisbord, ProsecutingAggression, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 161, 162-76
(2008) and sources cited at 162-63, nn.6, 12; see also OSCAR SOLERA, DEFINING THE CRIME
OF AGGRESSION (2007).
3.

Weisbord, supranote 2, at 167.

4. See generally Noah Weisbord, The 1990s and the Use of Force: Anxiety,
Realignment and New Justifications,22 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SEC. 129 (2010).

5. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 5(2), 121, 123, July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
6.

United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of

an International Criminal Court, Rome, It., June 15-July 17, 1998, Final Act ofthe United
Nations Diplomatic Conerence of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment (?/f an
InternationalCriminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/13 (Vol. 1) (July 17, 1998).
7.

Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 123.
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Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression ("SWGCA"),
composed of ICC States Parties and interested non-party states,8
which met formally at UN Headquarters and in The Hague, and informally at Princeton University, to comb through the details. 9 The
SWGCA's draft definition was adopted without changes at the Review Conference, and the ASP reached a consensus compromise over
the laden issues of jurisdiction and the entry into force of the
amendments.
In order to achieve an agreement among rival nations, the
ASP employed a number of drafting techniques, including the use of
"constructive ambiguity," in the language of the compromise where
nations could not reach specific agreement.' 0 The practical result, for
better or for worse, was to transfer the task of interpreting the definition of the crime of aggression and its jurisdictional conditions to the
ICC judges.
The crime of aggression may have overshadowed other issues
at the Review Conference, but it was not the only significant issue
that was discussed. Delegations also participated in a stocktaking
exercise where they considered the impact of the ICC Statute to
date.'
One of the questions given priority in these discussions was
12
goal of peace should figure into the work of the ICC.
the
how
In the years since the ICC's birth in 2002, perhaps the biggest
challenge for the nascent court has been fulfilling its mandate to investigate, prosecute and punish genocide, crimes against humanity
and war crimes in the midst of ongoing conflicts without undermining extra-judicial attempts to resolve the dispute through, for example, peace negotiations and indigenous justice traditions. The socalled peace versus justice dilemma has complicated a number of the
ICC's ongoing cases, notably in the Democratic Republic of Congo

8. Effectively, most of the members of the ASP sent delegations to the SWGCA, as
well as many non-party states including China, Iran, Russia and India, to name a few.
9.

For the records of these meetings, see THE PRINCETON PROCESS ON THE CRIME OF

AGGRESSION: MATERIALS OF THE SPECIAL WORKING GROUP ON THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION,

2003 2009 (Stefan Barriga et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter PRINCETON PROCESS].

10. Int'l Crim. Ct., Assemb. of States Parties [ICC-ASP], 6th Sess., New York, Nov.
30 Dec. 7, 2007, lnformal Inter-Sessional Meeting qf the Special Working Group on the
Crime of Aggression,
47, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/6/SWGCA/INF.I (July 25, 2007);
PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note 9, at 117.
11.

See

Stocktaking,

COAL.

FOR

THE

INT'L

http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=stocktaking (last visited Jan. 8, 2012).
12.

Id.

CRIM.

CT.,
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("DRC"), Central African Republic ("CAR"), Darfur, Kenya and

Uganda. 13
The peace versus justice dilemma has given rise to intense
debate concerning the proper role of the ICC. The commentary has
not been limited to observers of the ICC; arguments have been
launched from within the court itself. Stakeholders have invoked a
familiar pattern of the Rome Statute's provisions to justify competing
courses of action, among them prosecution at all costs, deferral of
cases, substitution of local for international justice, withdrawal of arrest warrants and amnesty (in various forms). Though scholars have
clarified the contours of the issue, the peace versus justice question
remains unresolved. 14 What the diplomatic delegations failed to do
in Kampala was to link the two fundamental issues they wrestled
with: the crime of aggression and the peace versus justice dilemma.
Because the problem will inevitably arise in the context of an aggression case, this article undertakes to establish the missing link between
the crime and the dilemma and propose ways an ICC judge could
mediate between the two.
If the ICC's practice to date is any indication, the peace versus justice dilemma will weigh heavily on the minds of the ICC judges as they mete out justice against political or military leaders accused of aggression. The crime of aggression was drafted with the
specific purpose of deterring threats to the peace; conceivably, the
goal of peace will figure prominently in its interpretation.1 5 Furthermore, where the Rome Statute as a whole contains quite a few gaps,
13. Juan E. Mendez, The Importance of Justice in Securing Peace, Rev. Conf. of the
Rome Statute, May 31-June 11, 2010, Kampala, Uganda, U.N. Doc. RC/ST/PJ/INF.3 (May
30, 2010).
14. See, e.g., Eric Blumenson, The Challenge of a Global Standard of Justice: Peace,
Pluralism and Punishment at the InternationalCriminal Court, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
801 (2006); David Hine, DuelingIdeals: Bridging The Gap Between Peace And Justice, 32
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 129 (2009); Linda M. Keller, Achieving Peace With Justice:
The International Criminal Court and Ugandan Alternative Justice Mechanisms, 23 CONN.
J. INT'L L. 209 (2008); Henry Lovat, Delineatingthe Interests of Justice, 35 DENY. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 275 (2007); Daniel Nsereko, The Role of The International Criminal Tribunals
in the Promotion of Peace and Justice: The Case qf the International Criminal Court, 19
CRIM. L.F. 373 (2008); Herbert Okun, The Role of International CriminalJustice in Peace
Negotiations, 25 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 779 (2007).
15. See Carsten Stahn, The 'End', the 'Beginning of the End' or the 'End of the
Beginning'? IntroducingDebates and Voices on the Definition of 'Aggression,' 23 LEIDEN
J. OF INT'L L. 875, 875-76 (2010) (observing that the crime "is embedded in peace
maintenance even more deeply than the other core crimes" due to its close relationship to jus
ad bellum and Article 39 of the UN Charter).
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ambiguities and contradictions that leave room for judicial interpretation, the crime of aggression, in leaving to judges the resolution of
longstanding negotiation debates, contains still more. It is largely
within these zones of interpretation that the peace versus justice debate can be expected to unfold. Because the criminalization of aggression requires the ICC to intervene in the domain of fundamental
national security, an area of discretion warily guarded by states, the
stakes will be especially high. Judicial interpretation of the crime of
aggression will not only determine the outcome of particular cases, it
will shape the international legal order.
This Article argues that the ICC judges should attempt to
promote peace as they do justice. It eschews narrow interpretive theories and proposes instead that the ICC judges take a variety of contextual factors into account as they interpret the law. Judging Aggression applies the author-participant's knowledge of the Kampala
negotiations as the basis for a doctrinal analysis revealing the gaps,
ambiguities and contradictions in the aggression framework that
leave room for judicial interpretation. Building on the literature on
the peace versus justice dilemma to date, it evaluates a range of ways
that well-intentioned international judges might attempt in their decisions to do justice while promoting peace in the context of an aggression case. The way that the ICC judges address the challenges they
encounter as they adjudicate what the Nuremberg Tribunal called
"the supreme international crime," 16 will serve, whether they succeed
or fail in harmonizing the demands of justice and peace, as a lesson
on the exercise of the judicial function.
I.

THE KAMPALA OUTCOME

The aggression amendments adopted in Kampala are made up
of three facets: (1) the definition of the crime; (2) the jurisdictional
regime specific to the crime of aggression; and (3) the mechanism for
the entry into force of the amendments. 17 These amendments, which
ICC judges will be expected to interpret and apply, were part of a
larger political compromise that balances all three. The following
section explains each facet in turn, as well as their relationship, and
16. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, 41 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 172, 186 (1947) [hereinafter Nuremberg Judgment].
17. See Kampala Outcome, supra note 1; see also Roger S. Clark, Negotiating
Provisions Defining the Crime of Aggression, its Elements and the Conditions Ibr ]CC
Exercise ofJurisdictionOver It, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1103, 1104 (2009).
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identifies key gaps and ambiguities that leave room for judicial interpretation.
A.

The Definition

The definition of the crime of aggression builds from the Nuremberg precedent, which effectively shifted the subject of international law from the state to the individual by declaring, "[c]rimes
against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can
the provisions of international law be enforced."1 8 In 2010, the ASP
revitalized the first Nuremberg Principle as it pertains to international
law regulating the use of force: "Any person who commits an act
which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible
therefor and liable to punishment."1 9
The definition provides a fascinating legal-doctrinal answer to
two of the twentieth century's most troubling questions. First, is
there a distinction between a just and an unjust war and, if so, is it
possible to define the difference with sufficient specificity in universal terms? The second question, raised by Hannah Arendt in Eichmann in Jerusalem,20 is how to find a normatively persuasive basis
for judges to hold an individual accountable for acts of political violence that require many people to carry out. 2 1 Arendt dismissed the
debate between the prosecution and defense in the Eichmann trial
over whether the defendant was "a 'tiny cog' in the machinery of the
Final Solution" as "legally pointless," focusing instead on the existence of a crime and relying on the tribunal to transform the "cogs in
the machinery ... back into perpetrators. '22 But where Arendt left it
to the Jerusalem court to transform Eichmann from cog into perpetrator, the SWGCA was obligated to find a normatively persuasive legal-doctrinal basis upon which the ICC judges could impose individ18.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 223 (1947).

19.

Int'l Law Comm'n, Principles of internationalLaw Recognized in the Charter of

the
Niirnberg
Tribunal
and
in
the
Judgment
of
the
Tribunal,
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft /"20articles/7 1 1950.pdf.
20.

HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL

289 (2006).
21. See Noah Weisbord, Evolutions of the Jus Ad Bellum: The Crime of Aggression,
103 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 435, 439 (2009).
22.

ARENDT, supra note 20, at 289.
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ual criminal liability for violence carried out en masse.
The two components of the substantive definition of aggression, the state act and its doctrinal link to the individual perpetrator,
represent answers to these questions. The state act, set out in Article
8 bis, paragraph 1 of the definition, with an enumerated list of acts
that qualify in paragraph 2, constitutes the Review Conference's distinction between a just and an unjust war. 23 The SWGCA's answer
to this highly politicized question relied on post-World War II international legal precedent and the UN Charter in particular.
The "act of aggression" is a violation of the UN Charter that,
by its character, gravity and scale, surpasses the "manifest" threshold
established by the drafters. One of the Understandings appended to
the Kampala outcome 24 explains that the drafters intended character,
gravity and scale to be interpreted together and that no one component is sufficient to give rise to liability on its own. 25 Thus, a few
bullets fired across a border would not be grave or large-scale enough
to qualify as a manifest violation; nor, for example, would the goodfaith delivery of emergency medical supplies by military helicopter
to a vulnerable refugee population without the prior approval of the
host state qualify because the character of the act is humanitarian and
not overtly threatening. On the other hand, the Special Working
Group regularly referred to Saddam Hussein's 1990 invasion of Kuwait as a clear-cut act of aggression.
The second paragraph of the definition offers the judges specific guidance by listing categories of acts that will qualify as aggression.26 These include invasion, bombardment, blockade, attacking
another state's armed forces, contravening an agreement to station
forces in another state (e.g., by refusing to leave), offering one's state
as a launching ground for another state to attack a third state and the

23.

Article 8 bis, para. 1 provides:

For the purpose of this Statute, 'crime of aggression' means the planning,
preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to
exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an
act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a
manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.
Rome Statute, supranote 5, art. 8 bis, para. 1.
24. The "Understandings" are interpretive aids meant to assist judges in determining
the drafters' intent.

25. Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, ann. II, para. 7.
26.

See Rome Statute, supra note 5, ann. 1, art. 8 bis, para. 2.
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sending of armed bands to attack another state. 27 The 2003 U.S. intervention in Iraq is an example of an invasion; it also included bombardment of a gravity and scale captured by the definition. 28 The
most important question pertaining to the list of acts is whether the
list is open or closed. 29 The ICC's answer to this question will determine whether acts of aggression beyond the scope of the enumerated categories, such as cyber attacks causing massive damage to
30
persons and property, will fall within the ambit of the crime.
The second component of the definition of aggression, the
link to the individual perpetrator, is composed of four strands. The
definition itself contains two strands: conduct verbs and a leadership
clause. It is through the conduct verbs that individuals who planned,
prepared, initiated or executed the act of aggression can be held accountable and punished for it. These conduct verbs were borrowed
from the London Charter establishing the Nuremberg Tribunal 31
where they were used to hold Nazi leaders accountable for the crime
against peace, the predecessor to the crime of aggression, after World
War II.
The second strand is the leadership clause. Only those individuals in a position to effectively exercise control over, or to direct
the political or military action of, a state can be held responsible and
punished. 32 An ordinary foot soldier, by this definition, is not criminally responsible for the collective act of the military. The scope of
both of these doctrinal strands is open to interpretation by a judge ap33
plying the provision.
The last two strands linking the individual and the state act

27.

See id.

28. Legal questions would arise only regarding the criterion of "character." This is
where a defense lawyer might, for example, raise the issue of self-defense under Article 51

of the UN Charter.
29. See Report qf the Informal Inter-SessionalMeeting of the Special Working Group
on the Crime oqlAggression, supranote 10, 1 47; Weisbord, supra note 2, at 182.
30.

See infia Part 1II.

31. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Annexed to London Agreement
for the Establishment of an International Military Tribunal, art. 6(a), Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat.
544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter London Charter].
See also Noah Weisbord,
ConceptualizingAggression, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 49 (2009), for a discussion of
the Nuremberg Tribunal's use of these terms.
32.

Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, annex I, art. 8 bis, para. 1.

33. For an analysis of the language of the definition, see Weisbord, supra note 31, at
43; see also Michael Anderson, Reconceptualizing Aggression, 60 DUKE L. J. 411 (2010).
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appear in Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute, 34 which pertains to individual criminal responsibility and is equally applicable to all of the
ICC crimes. The first link is the liability doctrine commonly known
as joint criminal enterprise ("JCE") or enterprise participation: "a
common plan, design or purpose which amounts ... to the commis-

sion of a crime. ' 35 The ICC judges will apportion individual blame
for the collective act of aggression by finding that the defendant was
a leader of a common plan to violate the UN Charter.36 The second
strand is found in the modes of perpetration and participation in the
commission of the crime, also contained in Article 25(3) of the Rome
Statute. A leader can perpetrate the crime or participate in it by ordering, soliciting, inducing, assisting or providing 37means for its
commission (individually, jointly or through another).
Thus, four doctrinal links-two in the definition of aggression
itself and two in Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute-ensure the ICC's
ability to transform cog into perpetrator, at least in theory. However,
the four doctrinal links between the individual and the collective act
of aggression are not always compatible, and reconciling them will
require some technical sophistication on the part of the ICC judges. 38
The definition of the crime is supplemented by the elements
of the crime, a legal instrument that serves as an authoritative guide
to the ICC prosecutor and judges in the interpretation of the definition. 39 An individual can only be held criminally responsible for the
crime of aggression if the material elements of the crime, conceived
as conduct, consequences and circumstances, are committed with the
requisite intent and knowledge as set out in this instrument. 40 The in34. See Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 25(3); see also Weisbord, supra note 31, at
54-62 (analyzing how these doctrinal links will apply to the crime of aggression); Weisbord,
supra note 2, at 190.
35. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, 1 772 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000); see Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 25(3)(d).
36. See Weisbord, supra note 31, at 54 59, for an explanation of why the other
contenders, such as command responsibility, are unlikely to be useful as liability doctrines in
an aggression case.
37. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 25(3)(a) (d); see Weisbord, supra note 2, at 190;
Weisbord, supranote 31, at 61.
38. Weisbord, Conceptualizing Aggression, supra note 31, at 61 (observing, for
example, that "[i]f a leader prepares individually, there is no one being led" and asking
whether a leader can be an assistant).
39.

See Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, annex 1I, art. 8 bis.

40. See Roger Clark, Elements of Crimes in Early Confirmation Decisions of the Pretrial Chambers o/ the InternationalCriminal Court, 6 N.Z.Y.B. INT'L L. 209 (2008).
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troduction to the elements, for example, clarifies that "[t]here is no
requirement to prove that the perpetrator has made a legal evaluation
as to whether the use of armed force was inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. '4 1 This informs an ICC judge that it is his
or her responsibility to make an objective determination here. The
elements do not expand the definition; they remain safely within it.
Finally, several "Understandings" were appended to the report of the Review Conference as an indication of the drafters' intent.
The peace versus justice dilemma will surface in the areas of
the definition that will require interpretation. These key zones are
discussed infra in Section D of this part.
B.

Jurisdiction

The most intractable debate over the crime of aggression
since the drafting of the Rome Statute has been whether the Security
Council should have the exclusive authority to trigger an aggression
case. 42 The debate was finally resolved in Kampala. 43 The Review
Conference decided that the ICC should be able to seize jurisdiction
over aggression cases in three situations: (1) where a State Party refers a case to the ICC Prosecutor; (2) where the Security Council refers a case to the Prosecutor; or (3) where the Prosecutor initiates it
proprio motu and the Pre-Trial Division of the ICC, convening in full
session, authorizes him or her to proceed. 44 To achieve this result, an
intricate set of trade-offs was brokered between the proponents of
Security Council exclusivity and the majority of the Review Confer45
ence.
The ICC has the broadest authority to prosecute aggressors
when the Security Council refers a case, the so-called Article 15 ter
trigger. 46 Under Article 15 ter, the Security Council has the power to

41.

Kampala Outcome, supra note 1,annex II, art. 8 bis, para. 2.

42. See generally THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
AGGRESSION 121-50 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppi Nesi eds., 2002).

AND

THE

CRIME

OF

43. See Christian Wenaweser, Reaching the Kampala Compromise on Aggression:
The Chair'sPerspective, 23 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 883 (2010) (explaining how the compromise
over the jurisdictional trigger was brokered).
44.

Kampala Outcome, supra note 1,annex I, arts. 15 bis, 15 ter.

45. For an analysis of the trade-offs, see Claus Kress & Leonie von Holtzendorff, The
Kampala Compromise on the Crime oAggression, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1179 (2010).
46.

Kampala Outcome, supra note 1,annex I, art. 15 ter.
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resolve, under its robust Chapter VII mandate, to refer an aggression
situation to the ICC Prosecutor. This trigger gives the ICC unlimited
global jurisdiction over aggression. The Prosecutor can investigate
ICC States Parties, non-Party States, and ICC states that have chosen,
under the Kampala outcome, to opt-out of the state and proprio motu
triggers.
The ICC's robust authority and global reach under the 15 ter
trigger derive from the Security Council's power to authorize the use
of all means necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security. 47 There are, however, some limits on the ICC's power to
investigate and try alleged aggressors pursuant to the Article 15 ter
trigger. The first is a limit that can only be put in place by the Security Council itself. Under Article 16 of the Rome Statute, the Security Council, under Chapter VII, can request that the ICC halt an investigation or prosecution for renewable twelve-month intervals. 48 For
the Security Council to defer a case, the investigation or prosecution
must constitute a threat to international peace and security. 49 The
crux of an Article 16 deferral, which proponents of a powerful ICC
appreciate, is that it is based upon a positive resolution of the Security Council and it can therefore be vetoed by one of the five permanent members with an interest in seeing an aggression case proceed.
A second limit is that a Security Council determination that
an act of aggression has occurred is not prejudicial to the court. 50 A
referral or determination merely triggers ICC jurisdiction; the Security Council's resolution has no bearing on the application of the definition to the facts of the case. The implication is that the ICC and the
Security Council could conceivably make contradictory determinations regarding a particular use of armed force.
This development is the outcome of a protracted debate within the Special Working Group about the importance of fair trial
standards versus the structure of the international order. 51 The debate

47.

U.N. Charter arts. 41, 42.

48.

Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 16.

49. U.N. Charter art. 39 ("The Security Council shall determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.").
50.

Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, annex I, art. 15 ter, para 4.

51. Coal. for the Int'l Crim. Ct., Informal Inter-sessional Meeting (f the Special
Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, Held at the Liechtenstein Institute on SelfI
Determination, Woodrow Wilson School, at Princeton University, New Jersey, United
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was ultimately resolved in favor of those prioritizing fair trial standards. They argued, persuasively, that it would be prejudicial to the
accused if the Security Council, unchallenged by the defense,
could
52
simply determine that an act of aggression has occurred.
In addition to the Security Council trigger, the ICC also has
the authority to prosecute aggressors if a State Party refers a case 53 or
if the Prosecutor initiates a case under his or her proprio motu power. 54 The fact that the ICC can make determinations pertaining to the
use of armed force independently of the Security Council is a historic
development in international law; it represents a shift from politics to
law in the use of force regime.
This remarkable outcome was achieved through concessions
from the majority of states at the Review Conference to the small
number of states that sought to retain complete Security Council authority over determinations of aggression. These concessions became jurisdictional limits, set out in article 15 bis, that must be respected should a State Party or the Prosecutor, rather than the
Security Council, wish to initiate a case.
Most importantly, the ICC cannot acquire jurisdiction over
the leaders of non-party states that commit aggression unless the Security Council refers the case under article 15 ter. 55 The state referral
and proprio motu triggers do not suffice. This means that, unlike the
other currently enforceable ICC crimes, should a non-party state attack a State Party, the leaders of the non-party state cannot be prosecuted unless the Security Council refers the situation. The implication is that leaders in the United States, Israel, Iran, North Korea and
other non-party states do not fall within the ambit of the crime of aggression.
Another group that falls outside the scope of the crime are the
leaders of States Parties that opt out of the state referral and proprio
motu triggers. Article 15 bis, paragraph 4, allows an ICC State Party
to declare that it does not accept the court's jurisdiction over aggression by filing a declaration with the registrar of the ICC. A state optStates, from 8 to 11 June 2006, Report of the C1CC Team on Aggression, at 28 (Aug. 26,
2006) [hereinafter (C1CC Report], http://www.ICCnow.org/documents/TeamReportOn
IntersessionalMeeting_26Aug06.pdf.
52.

Id.

53.

Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 13, para. a.

54.

Id. art. 13, para. c.

55.

See Kress & von Holtzendorff, supra note 45, at 1213; Stahn, supra note 15, at

878.
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ing out of the aggression regime under this provision can withdraw
its declaration at any time and, certainly, civil society groups will
lobby the state to obtain this result. In addition, Article 15 bis stipulates that a State Party that has opted out of the aggression amendments shall reconsider its declaration every three years while the declaration is active, presumably with the intention of eventually
withdrawing it. 56
One of the longstanding debates within the SWGCA was
whether an international organ, such as the UN General Assembly or
the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), should be empowered to
determine that a state has committed an act of aggression for the purpose of triggering ICC jurisdiction in the event the Security Council
is silent. 57 The permanent members of the Security Council and their
allies were against the idea. Other states within the SWGCA had
their own preferences for one organ or another. Some states preferred that the pre-trial chamber of the ICC have the authority to
make the determination itself. Skeptics were worried that this highly
sensitive determination pertaining to the state act of aggression might
be too onerous and politically fraught for criminal law judges to
bear. 58 Ultimately, the Review Conference decided to entrust this determination to the Pre-Trial Division of the court, that is, all of the
ICC's pre-trial judges convening in full session. 59 This was a victory
for the proponents of an independent court because the provision allows the ICC to acquire jurisdiction over an aggression case on its
own if the Security Council is silent for six months. 60 The decision
to buttress the pre-trial chamber in aggression cases, unnecessary in
any other type of ICC case, was intended to assuage those states concerned that the pre-trial judges might be biased or vulnerable to political pressure. The reasoning was that adding more judges whose personal and political proclivities would counterbalance each other
offsets those risks.
56. See Kress & von Holtzendorff, supra note 45, at 1212 (describing the Article 15 bis
opt-out provision as effectuating a "soft" consent-based regime, rather than a "hard"
consent-based regime in which States Parties would have been required to opt in to the
aggression amendment for it to apply to their nationals and territory).
57. ICC-ASP, supra note 10, paras. 51-62; ICC-ASP, Princeton, NJ, June 13-15 2005,
lnformal Inter-SessionalMeeting qf the Special Working Group on the Crime ol'Aggression,
63 74, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/4/32 (June 2005), in PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note 9 at
176 77.
58.

CICC Report, supra note 51, at 16.

59.

Kampala Outcome, supranote 1, annex 1, art. 15 bis, para. 8.

60.

Id.
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Another aspect of the compromise between the proponents of
an independent ICC and the proponents of Security Council exclusivity in the realm of jus ad bellum determinations, which the Review
Conference built into the jurisdictional regime, is a mandatory dialogue between the court and the Council. Even if the ICC Prosecutor
concludes after a preliminary analysis that there is a reasonable basis
to proceed with an aggression investigation, he or she must complete
another step before moving forward: the Prosecutor must notify the
UN Secretary-General of the situation and provide him or her with
documentation that aggression has occurred. 61 The SecretaryGeneral is expected to pass on the Prosecutor's documentation to the
Security Council. After this exchange, the Security Council has six
months to deliberate and make a determination before the Prosecutor
can proceed. Only if the Security Council has not made a determination or a referral by that time can the Prosecutor move forward and
request that the Pre-Trial Division of the court authorize an investigation. 62
The hope of a number of the drafters is that the involvement
of the ICC will spur the Council to respond to breaches of the peace
in a more principled manner than it has in the past. Going forward, if
the Council does not do its job, the court can step up to the plate.
C.

Entry into Force

A key aspect of the Kampala outcome pertains to the conditions that must be met before the aggression amendments will enter
into force and the ICC can start a case. This mechanism determines
the temporal jurisdiction of the court and, in particular, the earliest
date that the ICC can act upon an alleged violation. The entry into
force mechanism is a moving target with three interrelated conditions.
Under the first condition, thirty States Parties must ratify or
accept the amendment. 63 Judging from the number of states supporting and actively promoting the aggression amendments at the Kampala Review Conference, this number should not be especially difficult to reach. If only the African Group and the Group of Latin
American and Caribbean States, groups strongly supportive of the

61.

Id. art. 15 bis, para. 6.

62.

Id. art. 15 bis, para. 8.

63.

Id. art. 15 bis, para. 2, art. 15 ter, para. 2.
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aggression amendments, ratify, this first condition will have been
met. The ICC must then wait at least a year after the thirtieth state
ratifies or accepts the amendment before exercising jurisdiction over
64
the crime.
Under the second condition, the court can seize jurisdiction
over aggression after two-thirds of the ASP have decided that the
ICC should proceed. 65 This condition requires a larger number of
states to agree than the first, as thirty states out of 111 at the time of
the Review Conference (not accounting for new signatories to the
Rome Statute) is less than two-thirds. Nevertheless, two-thirds of the
ASP may not be a particularly onerous condition to meet either. The
aggression amendments were adopted by consensus in Kampala with
only a handful of states signaling displeasure with the outcome. The
states that were not fully on board were predominantly the permanent
members of the Security Council and their closest allies. Of the
members of the ASP, France and the United Kingdom were the only
permanent members of the Security Council with voting rights, and
they chose not to block the consensus.
The third entry into force condition is a simple time delay of
seven years. Under Articles 15 bis and 15 ter, paragraphs 3, "[t]he
Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in accordance with this article, subject to a decision to be taken after 1
January 2017 .... ,,66 As a result of these paragraphs, even if twothirds of the ASP is prepared to activate ICC jurisdiction over the
crime, the earliest that the court can act against an alleged aggressor
is January 1, 2017. If it takes longer than seven years for thirty states
to ratify or accept the aggression amendments and one year to pass
after the thirtieth ratification, this will delay the ASP vote past this
threshold date. In sum, the prohibition against aggression may be on
the books, but it will only come into force after thirty states sign on,
seven years pass and two-thirds of ICC member states vote to trigger
it.
This delay is frustrating for some. However, the conditions
for entry into force should not be too difficult to satisfy, 67 and the

64.

Id.

65. Id. art. 15 bis, para. 3, art. 15 ter, para. 3 (requiring the agreement of "the same
majority of States Parties as is required for the adoption of an amendment to the Statute").

66.

Id.

67.

See David Scheffer, Adoption qf the Amendments on Aggression to the Rome

Statute qf the International Criminal Court, ASIL BLOG INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
REVIEW CONFERENCE (June 13, 2010), http://iccreview.asil.org/ (remarking that he "would
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holding period may be prudent. The delay gives governments and
militaries occasion to adjust to the new legal landscape and modify
their policies and practices if necessary. If the effect of the activated
Rome Statute is any indication, this review is likely to influence the
policies and practices of non-party states as well as States Parties.
D.

Key Zones of Interpretation

For the sake of clarity, the gaps and ambiguities built into the
Kampala outcome are best considered in sequence, as an ICC judge
is likely to face them, and in three groups: (1) jurisdiction and admissibility, (2) the act of aggression and (3) the culpable conduct
linking the individual to the collective act.
1.

Jurisdiction and Admissibility

Judges responsible for determining whether an aggression
case is admissible must contend with four major zones of ambiguity
in the Kampala amendments and the overall ICC Statute. They will
need to interpret any Security Council determination relating to the
case, decide where the alleged act of aggression took place, assess
the genuineness of domestic investigations into the incident(s) and
interpret Article 53 of the ICC Statute, which empowers the Prosecutor to call off an investigation or prosecution if it is not in the interests of justice.
a.

Interpretingthe Security Council Determination

First, the judges 68 will need to interpret whether the Security
Council has determined that aggression has occurred. 69 This is not as

be surprised if, by January 1, 2017, the 30-State Party requirement will not have been met");

Hans-Peter Kaul, s It Possible to Prevent or Punish Future Aggressive War-Making? 2
(FICHL Occasional Paper Series No. 1, 2011), http://www.fichl.org/fileadmin/fichl/
documents/FICHLOPS/FICHL OPS 1 Kaul.pdf ("There is little doubt that this treaty, the
Rome Statute, will soon have an article 8bis and articles 15bis and 15ter incorporating the
crime of aggression.").
68.

The Pre-Trial Division convening in full session.
69. The judges must also interpret whether the Security Council has determined that
aggression has not occurred, whether it has been silent and/or whether it has properly
referred a case to the ICC under article 15 ter but left it to the ICC judges to make the
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obvious as it might seem. Since the Council began its work in 1945,
it has only made express resolutions condemning aggression thirtyone times. 70 Meanwhile, a recent study concluded that 313 armed
conflicts took place between 1945 and 2008.71 It is more common
for the Security Council to use other terminology to condemn the use
of force. 72 Past practice suggests that the Security Council is likely
to determine that an aggressive act constitutes a threat to the peace, a
breach of the peace or the unlawful use of force. 73 The accused,
faced with a Security Council resolution containing these terms, rather than the more blunt condemnation of aggression per se, can be
expected to challenge the Prosecutor's authority to proceed. It will
be up to the pre-trial chamber to interpret article 15 ter and decide
whether the Security Council determination is a sufficient basis for
the Prosecutor's investigation.
The judges will be faced with an even more challenging task
of judicial interpretation when the Security Council determines that
aggression has not occurred. The Kampala outcome spells out with
some specificity what an ICC judge should do when the Security
Council refers an aggression case to the ICC, 74 makes a determina76
tion that aggression has occurred 75 or remains silent for six months.
But, as Scheffer recently explained: "Nothing in Article 15 bis ex-

determination. See David Scheffer, The Complex Crime of Aggression under the Rome
Statute, 23 LEIDEN J. INT'L. L. 897, 901 (2010).
70. Nicolaos Strapatsas, Rethinking General Assembly Resolution 3314 (1974) as a
Basis.fir the Definition of Aggression under the Rome Statute qf the ICC, in RETHINKING
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:

THE SUBSTANTIVE PART 155 (Olaoluwa Lousanya ed.,

2007) (detailing the Security Council's resolutions condemning aggression since 1945).
71.

in

Christopher Mullins, Conhlict Victimization and Post-Conflict Justice 1945 2008,

THE PURSUIT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE:

A WORLD STUDY ON CONFLICTS,

VICTIMIZATION, AND POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE 67, 67 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2010).
72. Conference on International Criminal Justice, Turin, It., May 14-18, 2007, Policy
Issues under the United Nations Charter and the Rome Statute, at 30, U.N. Doc. ICCASP/6/INF.2 (Aug. 21, 2007), available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/TurinReport
_English_21-08-07_ADVANCECOPY.pdf
73.

Id.

74. Kampala outcome, supra note 1, annex 1, art. 15 ter (directing the court to proceed
with the case).
75. Id. art. 15 bis, paras. 6-7 (requiring the Prosecutor to notify the Secretary-General
of the situation before the Court and then proceed with the case).
76. Id. para. 8 (imposing a condition precedent to proceeding with the case, namely,
that the prosecutor seek and obtain the authorization of the Pre-Trial Division to move
forward).
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plicitly prohibits the ICC from forging ahead even if the Security
Council renders a negative determination. '77 The course of an aggression case will hinge upon this early judicial interpretation.
Scheffer concludes, "In the absence of relevant language contemplating a negative 8determination on aggression, Article 15 bis leaves a
'7
yawning gap."

This aspect of the Kampala outcome raises, in a slightly different guise, the controversial question that legal scholars debated in
relation to the 1998 NATO intervention in Kosovo and places its resolution squarely with the judges. 79 If the Security Council is blocked
by a single permanent member from making an affirmative Chapter
VII resolution condemning an act of aggression, does this amount to
a Security Council determination that aggression has not occurred, or
does it amount to silence? Presumably, a number of factors will
shape each judge's reasoning as they interpret Article 15 bis of the
Kampala outcome, not the least of which will be his or her assessment of how the decision will affect peace and stability.
b.

Where the Act ofAggression Took Place

Another early interpretation that an ICC judge will be required to undertake in order to establish whether an aggression case
is admissible is where an alleged act of aggression took place. Under
the Kampala outcome, "[i]n respect of a State that is not a party to
this Statute, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction over the crime
of aggression
when committed by that State's nationals or on its terri80
tory."
What is clear from Article 15 bis, paragraph 5 (quoted above),
is that, absent a Security Council referral under 15 ter, the ICC has no
jurisdiction over the political and military leaders of non-party states
that attack ICC States Parties. Even if the United States (a non-party
state) attacks Canada (an ICC State Party) and the aggression
amendments are in force in Canada, U.S. political and military leaders cannot be investigated and tried by the ICC.
However, the interpretive question arises if Canada attacks
77.

Scheffer, supra note 69, at 901.

78.

Id. at 902.

79.

INDEP.

INT'L

COMM'N

ON

Kosovo,

THE

Kosovo

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED (2000).

80.

Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, annex I, art.
15 bis, para. 5.

REPORT:

CONFLICT,
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the United States. Article 15 bis, paragraph 5 specifies that the ICC
shall not exercise jurisdiction over aggression when committed on
the territory of a non-party state. But was the crime of aggressionthe planning, preparation, initiation or execution of a manifest violation of the UN Charter-committed where the attack was launched
(Canada) or where it landed (the United States)? If the judges find
that the act of aggression was committed where the attack landed (the
United States), the ICC will have no jurisdiction when a State Party
that has signed the aggression amendments attacks a non-party state.
If the judges find that the act of aggression was committed where the
attack was launched (Canada) or, in accordance with the majority
opinion at the Review Conference, where the attack was launched
and where it landed, the ICC has jurisdiction over the Canadian leaders who planned, prepared, initiated or executed this hypothetical attack.
c.

Complementarity

The principle of complementarity may also require interpretation by ICC judges. Under Article 17 of the ICC Statute, a case is inadmissible while it is being investigated or prosecuted by a state with
jurisdiction, unless that state is unwilling or unable to proceed in a
genuine manner.8 1 A case is also inadmissible when it has been investigated and the state has decided not to prosecute, unless, as
above, the state has decided not to prosecute because it is unwilling
or unable. Here, the ICC judges will be required to determine whether a domestic investigation or prosecution of an alleged aggressor is
genuine or whether it is a pretext meant to render a case inadmissible
at the ICC.
The ICC Statute requires a judge assessing whether a state is
unwilling to proceed to consider, on top of the genuineness of the
proceedings, whether there has been an unjustified delay, whether the
proceedings are being conducted independently and impartially, and
whether they are being conducted in any other manner inconsistent
with the intent to bring the accused to justice. 82 The ambiguity of
these standards leaves the ICC judges with ample discretion to interpret the domestic investigation or prosecution of aggressors as precluding ICC jurisdiction or inviting it. For instance, it will be a mat-

81.

Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 17.

82.

Id. art. 17, para. 2.
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ter of judicial interpretation whether an official response such as the
United Kingdom's Chilcot Inquiry into that country's use of force in
Iraq amounts to an investigation for the purposes of precluding ICC
jurisdiction under Article 17.83
d.

The Interests of Justice

There may be an incontrovertible legal and factual basis for
the ICC prosecutor to investigate and prosecute an individual for aggression, but he or she may still decline to do so under Article 53 of
the Rome Statute because doing so would not serve the interests of
justice. Judges can review the decision not to proceed on this basis at
the request of the referring state 84 or the Security Council 85 or by the
86
judges' own volition.
However, the judges will not find much guidance in the ICC
Statute about which investigations and prosecutions should be called
off in the interest of justice. Article 53 directs the Prosecutor and the
court to "tak[e] into account all the circumstances, including the
gravity of the crime, the interests of victims and the age or infirmity
'87
of the alleged perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged crime.
The implication is that it will be a matter for judicial interpretation
whether the judges, faced with an aggression investigation or prosecution that has been deferred by the Prosecutor in the interests of justice, 88 will rekindle it. If the early practice of the court is any indication, Article 53 will only be used to call off an investigation or
prosecution in the most unusual of circumstances. To date, no case
has been called off in the interests of justice.
2.

The Act of Aggression

There are two stages throughout the legal process during
which the ICC judges will be responsible for making determinations
concerning the act of aggression and, in particular, whether or not an
83. About the Inquiry, THE IRAQ INQUIRY, http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/about.aspx
(last visited Jan. 9, 2012).
84.

Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 53(3)(a).

85.

Id.

86.

Id. art. 53(3)(b).

87.

Id. art. 53(2)(c).

88.

Id. art. 53(1)(c), (2)(c).
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act sufficient to attract individual criminal responsibility under the
ICC Statute has occurred. The first is at the jurisdictional phase of
the proceedings when the pre-trial chamber is assessing whether a
case is admissible. The second stage is at the trial itself.89
At each of these stages, an ICC judge will be faced with two
key areas of ambiguity requiring interpretation. First, the judge must
determine whether a manifest violation of the UN Charter has occurred, and second, the judge must decide what acts qualify as aggression. These areas of ambiguity, introduced below, will be considered in more detail in Part III of this article in the context of three
hard cases: the scope of self-defense, the character of an armed attack and the legal status of humanitarian intervention.
a.

A Manifest Violation of the UN Charter

The rules contained in the UN Charter and customary international law, which serve as the foundation of modem jus ad bellum, do
not apply themselves. They require interpretation. Debates over the
correct legal interpretation of the UN Charter, previously addressed
primarily through a disaggregated political process in which state officials responded to the use of force by another state in a diplomatic
venue, will be relegated to the ICC judges for resolution by formal
legal process. Within this process, the ICC judges will be required to
interpret the "manifest" qualifier in Article 8 bis, which is meant to
ensure that only the most clear-cut violations of the UN Charter attract individual criminal responsibility. 90 In doing so, the judges will
need to consider the character, gravity and scale of the use of armed
force by one state against another.9 1
b.

The Acts That Qualify as Aggression

The Review Conference defined an act of aggression as "the
use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial in-

89. A third opportunity will present itself if there is an appeal directly pertaining to the
act of aggression.
90. The PrepCom's term "flagrant," considered by the SWGCA to be a higher
threshold than "manifest," was ultimately rejected. See Preparatory Comm'n for the Int'l
Crim. Ct., Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, Discussion Paper Proposed by the
CoordinatorJuly 1 12, 2002, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2002/WGCA/RT. l/Rev.2 (July 11, 2002).
91.

Kampala Outcome, supra note 1,annex I, art.
8 bis, para. 2, annex II, paras. 6 7.
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tegrity or political independence of another State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. '92 The
ICC judges will be required to determine what amounts to armed
force and whether every use of armed force by one state against another violates that state's sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence. In addition, the ICC judges will have to interpret Article 8 bis, paragraph 2 of the Kampala outcome, and determine
whether the list of acts of aggression contained within it is closed or
whether new forms of aggression not yet contemplated might qualify.
3.

The Culpable Conduct Linking the Individual to the
Collective Act

An ICC judge will face four interpretive challenges when determining whether, under the definition of aggression and the Rome
Statute, an individual can be held criminally accountable for the collective act of aggression: (a) determining who counts as a leader; (b)
deciding what behavior falls within the ambit of "planning, preparing, initiating or executing," the actus reus of the crime of aggression; (c) establishing the scope of the joint criminal enterprise; and
(d) settling on the forms of perpetration and participation that matter
in the context of an aggression case.
a.

Determining Who Counts as a Leader

Under the definition of aggression, a leader is "a person in a
position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political
or military action of a State. '93 The components of the leadership
clause are the position of the person in the organization, his or her
capacity to exercise effective control or to directpolitical or military
action, and the nature of the aggressive act as one carried out collectively by a state.94 Each of these components is open to interpretation.
Position in an organization can be interpreted as the formal
position in a military hierarchy or an individual's central position in a
social network. 95 The higher standard of "effective control" is offset
92.

Id. annex 1, art. 8 bis, paras. 1-2.

93.

Kampala Outcome, supranote 1, annex 1, art. 8 bis, para. 1.

94.

Weisbord, supranote 31, at 44.

95.

Id. at 48.
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by the looser "or to direct" standard, and the judges will be expected
to interpret which standard applies in which contexts. Furthermore,
the "direct" standard, when taken with "political or military action of
a state," would seem to capture leaders outside of the formal state bureaucracy, such as business or religious leaders. Finally, the word
"state" has already given rise to an as yet unresolved debate in the
context of the Palestinian Authority's referral of its situation to the
ICC.96 The ICC judges will be expected to determine what political
entities qualify as states for the purpose of an aggression case.
b.

Deciding What Behavior Falls within the Actus Reus of the
Crime

The Nuremberg tribunal failed to meaningfully operationalize
or apply the conduct verbs in the London Charter's definition of
crimes against peace. 97 The justices, for example, concluded that
preparation included acts as diverse as Hitler's writing of Mein
Kampf as well as the Fdihrer's meetings with his highest-ranking military commanders." It will be for the ICC judges to add substance
and specificity to these terms in the context of an aggression case.
c.

Establishingthe Scope of the Joint CriminalEnterprise

Mark Osiel has called the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise
"dangerously illiberal" because the perpetrator cannot know before
the judge establishes the bounds of the enterprise whether he or she
will be captured within its ambit. 99 The leadership clause of the
crime of aggression narrows the doctrine, 100 but it does not complete96. See Office of the Prosecutor, Int'l Crim. Ct., Summary of Submissions on Whether
the Declaration Lodged by the Palestinian National Authority Meets Statutory Requirements
1 (May 3, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D3C77FA6-9DEE-45B1-ACCOB41706BB41E5/282852/PALESTINEFINAL201010272.pdf
(collecting
arguments
interpreting the term "State," including, for example, the argument that "article 12(3)
including the term 'State' should be examined in the context of the Statute and its object and
purpose ....
[T]he term 'State' is subject to variable defining characteristics under public
international law, and lacks an unambiguous or 'ordinary' meaning").
97.

Weisbord, supranote 31, at 50 52.

98.

Id. at 49-54.

99. Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1772 (2005).
100. Weisbord, supranote 31, at 59.
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ly answer Osiel's critique. Because many organizations (or even
states) can be implicated in an act of aggression, and because the
judges establish the scope of JCE after the crime is committed, leaders are not forewarned whether they will fall within the ambit of the
crime. This is an important zone of interpretation that the judges will
be expected to fill.
d.

Settling on the Forms of Perpetrationand ParticipationThat
Matter in the Context of an Aggression Case

There is an uneasy relationship between the conduct verbs
(planning, preparation, initiation and execution) and the modes of
perpetration and participation set out in Article 25(3)(a)-(f) of the
Rome Statute. 10 1 For example, under Article 25(3)(f) of the Rome
Statute, an "attempt" is an action that constitutes a "substantial step"
toward the execution of a crime. 102 The judges will need to resolve,
along with other compatibility issues, whether an incomplete plan
constitutes a substantial enough step to justify criminal responsibility
and punishment. 10 3 Moreover, it is not clear what providing the
means for the commission of "initiation" entails. 10 4 My prior scholarship has identified the compatibility problems. 10 5 It will be for the
judges, however, to devise solutions in the context of an aggression
case.
E.

Methodological Considerations: Legality and Judicial
Interpretation

In an article published before the Review Conference, Professor Michael Glennon warned that the draft definition of the crime of
10 6
aggression is "blank-prose" that violates the principle of legality.

101. Criminal responsibility attaches under Article 25 where a person commits
individually, commits jointly, commits through another, orders, solicits, induces, assists,
provides the means for or attempts the commission of a crime. Rome Statute, supra note 5,

art. 25(3)(a)-(f).
102. Id. art. 25(3)(f).
103.

Weisbord, supranote 31, at 62.

104. Id.
105.

Id.

106. Michael Glennon, The Blank-Prose Crime (f#Aggression, 35 YALE J. INT'L L. 71,
72 73 (2010). See Claus Kress's exchange with Andreas Paulus over the determinacy of the
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According to Glennon, "[p]rosecution under it would turn upon factors that the law does not delineate, rendering criminal liability unpredictable and undermining the law's integrity."' 10 7 Glennon is right
that the definition will require the ICC judges to fill gaps and ambiguities through judicial interpretation, but he overstates the claim that
the definition violates the principle of legality.108 The repercussion
for a judge hearing an aggression case is that the definition should
withstand the void-for-vagueness charge that is likely to be leveled
by the first defendant in an aggression case.
Perhaps most problematic for Glennon's vagueness argument
is his failure to consider the crime of aggression in its entirety and in
light of the ICC's rules of interpretation. The definition of aggression includes the Elements of the Crime and the Understandings,
which Glennon overlooks in his paper. According to Article 21 of
the ICC Statute, the court shall apply the ICC Statute as a whole, the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law. 10 9 If these sources are insufficient
to resolve the question at hand, the judges are expected to consider
''general principles of law derived . . . from national laws of legal
systems of the world" 110 and the court's own precedents.11 1 Faced

manifest qualifier: Andreas Paulus, Second Thoughts on the Crime of/Aggression, 20 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 1117, 1128 (2009); Claus Kress, Time for Decision: Some Thoughts on the
Immediate Future of the Crime qf Aggression: A Reply to Andreas Paulus,20 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 1129, 1146 (2009).
107.

Glennon,supra note 106 at 72 73.

108. Glennon argues that a statute violates the principle of legality "if it authorizes or
even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Id. at 85-86 (quoting Hill v.
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000)). Without an authoritative body to interpret Glennon's
test in accordance with rules accepted by an interpretive community, STANLEY E. FISH, IS
THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS'? THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES 147-74
(1980), Glennon's test (and the sources he invokes) are broad and vague enough to render
any law containing a standard or a general rule obsolete, Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and
Standards', 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 379 84 (1985). See also Kevin John Heller, Thoughts on
Glennon's "Blank-Prose Crime o Aggressiou," OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 29, 2010, 7:48 PM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2010 01 29/thoughts-on-glennons-blank-prose-crime-of-aggression/
(suggesting that Glennon's argument is tantamount to saying, "the crime of murder has no
content because countries disagree over whether abortion qualifies"). Notably, Glennon
argues that the war crimes provision in the ICC Statute is sufficiently determinate, though he
does not explain how Article 8(1), which seems as vulnerable under his test as any aspect of
the crime of aggression, survives. The terms "plan," "policy" and "wide-scale" in Article
8(1) all require interpretation by an authoritative body to be meaningfully delineated.
109.

Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 21(1 )(a) and (b).

110.

Id. art. 21(1)(c).
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with legal gaps and ambiguities of the type identified in the last subsection, ICC judges are expected to follow the applicable rules of interpretation, fill the gap or resolve the ambiguity and arrive at a wellreasoned decision-not invalidate the law.
II. WHEN PEACE AND JUSTICE CLASH
The peace versus justice dilemma has begun to coalesce into a
general structure with foreseeable conceptual elements and rhetorical
dynamics. Ideological intelligentsias who understand themselves to
be acting for stakeholder groups have begun to take positions in what
has become an intense academic, policy and media debate. Since the
compromise adopted in Kampala leaves room for interpretation, it
will be for the judges to work within the law to advance outcomes
that are consistent with the language, purpose and meaning of the
Rome Statute. The challenge the bench faces when judging aggression will be how to advance peace and justice without undermining
either.
The overall claim of this section, building on the outcome of
the stocktaking exercise on peace and justice at the Review Conference, 112 is that there is an "intrinsic link between justice and
peace" 1 13 and that "[p]eace and justice, if properly pursued, promote
and sustain one another."'1 14 The diplomatic delegations and experts

111. Id. art. 21(2).
112. M~ndez, supra note 13; ICC-ASP, Report of the Bureau on Stocktaking: The
Impact of the Rome Statute System on Victims and Affected Communities, U.N. Doc. ICCASP/8/52 (Mar. 18, 2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp-docs/ASP8R
/ICC-ASP-8-49-ENG.pdf; David Tolbert and Marieke Wierda, Stocktaking: Peace and
Justice (May 2010), http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-RSRC-Global-Peace-Briefing2010-English.pdf; Letter Dated 13 June 2008 from the Permanent Representatives of
Finland, Germany and Jordan to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General,
Annex, Nuremberg Declaration on Peace and Justice, U.N. Doc. A/62/885 (June 19, 2008)
[hereinafter Nuremberg Declaration], available at http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp-docs
/RC201O/Stocktaking/Nuremberg%20Declaration% 20UNGA.pdf; see generally ICC-ASP,
Stocktaking
of
International
Criminal
Justice,
http://icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP
/ReviewConference/Stocktaking/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2012) (collecting background and
additional papers and materials on peace and justice submitted during stocktaking exercise at
the Review Conference).
113.

Mdndez, supranote 13, at 1.

114.

Nuremberg Declaration, supra note 112, at 4; see also U.N. Secretary-General, The

Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies: Rep. of/the

Secretary-General, 1121, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004).
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participating in the stocktaking exercise in Kampala discussed how
the ICC and the ad hoc tribunals have advanced peace and justice to
date and what challenges the court has faced. They did not, however,
go so far as to consider how an ICC judge might attempt to advance
peace and justice, or to forecast how the dilemma might evolve in the
context of an aggression case. Extrapolating from the ICC's work
managing the peace versus justice dilemma to date and the work of
scholars who have mapped the problem and attempted to chart a
course, this part proposes an approach for judges to take when faced
with an aggression case where the peace versus justice dilemma is a
central concern.
How the peace versus justice dilemma is depicted determines
how it is addressed and resolved. What is most apparent when studying the rhetorical dynamics of the debate is that disagreement is
premised on remarkably narrow notions of both peace and justice.
Peace and justice are equated with institutional responses rather than
practical outcomes. Peace is associated with negotiations between
the leaders of warring groups or their representatives, accompanied
by an offer of amnesty for past crimes that is meant to serve as an incentive to reach an agreement. Justice is retributive. It takes place in
a courtroom in accordance with predetermined rules of evidence and
procedure and culminates in the punishment of guilty defendants.
The dilemma is starkly portrayed by Father Carlos Rodriguez of the
Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative: "[o]bviously, nobody can
convince a rebel leader to come to the negotiating table and at the
same time tell him that when the war ends he will be brought to trial." 1 15 An important starting point in mediating the tension between
peace and justice is to reconsider the debate using richer notions of
justice and also of peace.
A.

The Proponents of InternationalJustice

Within the narrow structure of this debate, the international
justice hawks, a group comprised of international prosecutors, victim
organizations, certain aid groups (such as Human Rights Watch and
International Crisis Group) and political representatives of important
middle powers (such as France, the United Kingdom and Belgium)
115. Katherine Southwick, Investigating War in Northern Uganda: Dilemmasfi)r the
InternationalCriminalCourt, 1 YALE J. INT'L AFF. 105, 110 (2005) (citing Frederick Nzwili,
The Forgotten War, CATH. WORLD NEWS (Apr. 1, 2004), http://www.cwnews.com/
news/viewstory.cfm?recnum 29396).
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have advocated for prosecution over amnesty for deontological, institutional competence and utilitarian reasons. 116 First, the justice
hawks rely on deontological concerns, such as the dignity of survivors of atrocity crimes and mass violence, as a primary reason for
preferring prosecution to amnesty. As explained by Harvard Law
School Dean Martha Minow, an author who has reflected upon the
various responses to mass violence, "through retribution, the community reasserts the truth of the victim's value by inflicting a publicly visible defeat on the wrongdoer." 117 According to Professor Eric
Blumenson, "[m]any retributivist supporters of the ICC believe that
bringing war criminals to justice is an absolute moral obligation of
the Court, or a non-negotiable right of the victims. ' 118 David Tolbert, president of the International Center for Transitional Justice and
former International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia ("ICTY"),
Deputy Chief Prosecutor, has advanced a related argument that amnesties are no longer, in any event, legally permissible. 119 The international justice hawks argue that some crimes are so heinous that
human dignity requires the perpetrators to be held criminally accountable and punished.
Additionally, institutional competence has been cited as a reason to favor prosecution over ICC-granted impunity. As ICC Deputy
Prosecutor Serge Brammertz, an international justice hawk who led
the UN investigation into the assassination of former Lebanese Prime
Minister Rafiq Hariri and later became Prosecutor of the ICTY, stated: "[t]he ICC is 'here for justice, not politics ....

The priority of the

Rome Statute is to prosecute[;] it's not to provide political stability."' 120 Here, the underlying logic is that the ICC lacks the expertise
116. Reed Brody, Playing it Firm, Fair and Smart: The EU and the ICC's Indictment of
Bashir,
EUR.
UNION
INST.
FOR
SEC.
STUD.
(Mar.
19,
2009)
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/EU ICCBashir.pdf.
117. For an appraisal of criminal trials as a response to mass violence, see MARTHA
MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS:

FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND

MASS VIOLENCE 12 (1998).
118.

Blumenson, supra note 14, at 819.

119.

Tolbert, supra note 112, at 2-3. See also Nuremberg Declaration, supra note 112,

at 4 ("The most serious crimes of concern to the international community, notably genocide,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity, must not go unpunished and their effective
prosecution must be ensured. The emergence of this principle as a norm under international
law has changed the parameters for the pursuit of peace. As a minimal application of this
principle, amnesties must not be granted to those bearing the greatest responsibility for

genocide, crimes against humanity and serious violations of international humanitarian
law.").
120.

Blumenson, supra note 14, at 821 (quoting Interview with Serge Brammertz,
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and tools to stabilize societies in conflict and, furthermore, that it was
created to do justice in a context insulated from global political pressures. 121 Likewise, Hannah Arendt argued in discussing the Eichmann trial: "Not only does [the Eichmann court] not have at its disposal 'the tools required for the investigation of general questions,' it
speaks with an authority whose very weight depends upon its limitation."' 122 In contrast, the UN Security Council is equipped to promote
peace and security by delaying ICC cases if necessary and making
room for amnesty when prosecution constitutes a threat to the
peace.123

Finally, the international justice hawks advance a utilitarian
case for prosecution, arguing that it will have a general deterrent effect. 124 McGill University Professor Payam Akhavan, a former prosecutor at the ICTY, argues: "beyond dispensing retributive justice
and vindicating the suffering of victims," the retributive justice para125
digm has a deterrent effect on political and military leaders.
Akhavan claims that retributive justice for genocide and other atrocities changes the rules of international relations: "[c]riminal accusations increasingly constitute a serious political impediment to the
ambitions of existing or aspiring leaders." 126
B.

The Proponentsof NegotiatedPeace

In contrast, proponents of negotiated peace base their preference for amnesty and negotiation over prosecution on three consequentialist arguments: (1) prosecution makes peace less attainable,
Deputy Prosecutor, ICC, at the Hague, Neth. (May 27, 2004)).
121.

For counterarguments, see Beatrice Le Fraper Du Hellen, Round Table, Prospects

Ibr the Functioning of the International Criminal Court, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL COURT:

A CHALLENGE TO IMPUNITY 291

(Mauro Politi &

Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2001).
122.

ARENDT, supra note 20, at 253-54.

123. See U.N. Charter art. 39 ("The Security Council shall determine the existence of
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41

and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.").
124. For data on quantitative analysis of the deterrent effect of justice initiatives on
ongoing conflicts, see Mdndez, supra note 13, at 5 11.
125. Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent
Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 7, 8 (2001).
126.

Jd. at9.
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(2) indictments raise obstacles to negotiation by hardening the positions of warring factions and (3) prosecutions can unite political
leaders who fear the ICC. 127
The proponents of negotiated peace cast themselves as political realists who recognize that a brokered peace is more important to
global stability than the pursuit of justice. Andrew Natsios, U.S.
Special Envoy to Sudan from 2006 to 2007, argues, "[i]nstead of trying to bring Sudan to the gates of some just and democratic Eden, the
West must encourage the Sudanese to work out a limited and practical settlement ....,,128 The Refugee Law Project, another proponent
of negotiated peace, which has worked closely with populations affected by the conflict in Northern Uganda, criticized the ICC referral
as a distraction from the plight of Northerners and peaceful avenues
for ending the war. 129
The proponents of negotiated peace assume that prosecution
impedes peace negotiations. 130 For example, according to Natsios,
the ICC indictment against President Omar al-Bashir endangered the
safety of civilians in Darfur and compromised the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the North and the South. 131 Natsios
argued that the threat of arrest increased Bashir's incentive to cling to
power as the only means of avoiding punishment. Furthermore, the
ICC indictment sent the wrong signal to rebel groups who would presumably add prosecution to their list of non-negotiable demands,
thereby making the possibility of a political agreement more re-

127. See, for example, the African Union statements supporting al-Bashir: African
Union Moves Aggressively to Shield BashirfIom Prosecution, SUDAN TRIB. (July 29, 2010),
http://www.sudantribune.com/African-Union-moves-aggressively, 35786; Afican Union in
Rift with Court, BBC NEWS (July 3, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8133925.stm.
128. Andrew Natsios, Waltz With Bashir: Why the Arrest Warrant against Sudan's
President Will Serve Neither Peace Nor Justice, FOREIGN AFF. (Mar. 23, 2009),
http://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/64904/andrew-natsios/waltz-with-bashir?page show.
129.

REFUGEE LAW PROJECT, POSITION PAPER ON THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF FORMAL

INVESTIGATIONS OF THE LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY BY THE CHIEF PROSECUTOR OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON THE SEARCH FOR PEACEFUL
SOLUTIONS

TO

THE

WAR IN NORTHERN

UGANDA

3

(July

28,

2004),

http://www.

refugeelawproject.org/ archive/2004/RLP.ICC.investig.pdf.
130. For a countervailing claim, see Mndez, supra note 13, at 1 ("Less than 85 per cent
of negotiations end in an agreement and far less are implemented. In Sudan, there was no
peace process before the ICC. All attempts at agreement failed. All attempts at appeasing
President Al Bashir failed. The idea that the ICC stopped an 'emerging' peace process is
pure invention.").
131.

Natsios, supra note 128.
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mote. 132 Natsios favored a "political deal between the north and
south based on a realistic appraisal of what is achievable under the
current unfavorable circumstances."'' 33 In short, peace required a
34
deal brokered by balancing the interests of competing groups. 1
C.

A Broader Concept ofJustice

Expanding the concept of justice beyond the purely retributive institutional response is a promising way to mediate the tension
between peace and justice. The Nuremberg Declaration on Peace
1 35
and Justice, for example, invoked at the ICC Review Conference,
contains a robust concept of justice with the potential to mitigate the
tension between the two aspirations:
"Justice" is understood as meaning accountability and
fairness in the protection and vindication of rights, and
the prevention and redress of wrongs.
Justice must be administered by institutions and
mechanisms that enjoy legitimacy, comply with the
rule of law and are consistent with international human rights standards. Justice combines elements of
criminal justice, truth-seeking, reparations and institutional reform as well as the fair distribution of, and
access to, public goods, and equity within society at
large.
Justice may be delivered by local, national and inter36
national actors.
132. Id. But see Tolbert, supra note 112, at 4 (offering a different account: "The ICC's
involvement clearly affected the parties' calculations and might have created the conditions
that made the February 2009 reconvening of the talks possible. International mediation
managed to draw the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and a majority of the Sudan
Liberation Movement (SLM) factions into a reinvigorated peace process in early 2010.").
133. Natsios, supra note 128. But see Nuremberg Declaration, supra note 112, at 5
("Mediators bear a responsibility to contribute creatively to the immediate ending of
violence and hostilities while promoting sustainable solutions. Their commitment to the
core principles of the international legal order has to be beyond doubt.").
134.

Natsios, supra note 128.

135. See, e.g., Rev. Conf. of the Rome Statute, May 31-June 11, 2010, Kampala,
Uganda, Annex V(b), Stocktaking of International Criminal Justice: Peace and Justice,
Moderator's Summary, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/RC/11 (Sept. 23, 2010), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp-docs/RC2010/RC- I I-Annex.V.b-ENG.pdf.
136.

Nuremberg Declaration, supra note 112, at 4.
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Within this definition, non-penal means such as truth and reconciliation commissions and traditional restorative justice processes have a
place in the aftermath of ICC crimes.
Professor Eric Blumenson, like the drafters of the Nuremberg
Declaration, begins his analysis of the peace versus justice problem
from a robust notion of justice. 137 His approach is to break down the
peace versus justice dilemma into three related questions. First, does
justice in the aftermath of crime always require prosecution, or will
non-penal means such as truth commissions, reparations, traditional
confessions and reintegration sometimes suffice? 38 Non-retributive
alternatives may bring accountability without interfering with parallel
peace negotiations.
Second, when justice requires prosecution, does this obligation outweigh all other obligations, such as the obligation to promote
the safety of innocent people threatened by a violent government or
insurgent organization? 139 This question opens the discussion to
countervailing ethical obligations that may, in defined contexts,
trump the ICC's retributive justice response. Blumenson concludes
that the ICC prosecutor or judges should defer or stop an investigation or prosecution in exceptional cases where proceedings would
140
have catastrophic results.
Finally, Blumenson asks how much deference the ICC should
14 1
diverse state responses to crimes within its jurisdiction.
to
afford
He advances a pluralistic view of international criminal justice and
contends that the ICC should provide leeway for diverse state responses. 142 Blumenson's analysis effectively expands the debate beyond a narrow competition between retributive justice and negotiations incentivized by amnesty by allowing for alternative institutional
responses to ICC crimes such as truth commissions and Mato
14 3
Oput.
Professor Linda Keller contributes to the peace versus justice

137.

Blumenson, supra note 14, at 805.

138.

Id. at 804.

139.

Id.

140. Id. at 844.
141.

Id. at 804.

142.

Id. at 804, 854, 859.

143. Id. at 809-10, 854-55. Mato Oput is a restorative justice ritual practiced in parts of
Northern Uganda. For a description of the ritual, see Mato Oput Ceremony, JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION PROJECT (May 10, 2010), http://justiceandreconciliation.com/2010/05/701.
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debate primarily through a black-letter analysis of the ICC Statute
where she identifies key avenues of deferral to alternative justice
mechanisms.144 For Keller, the ICC Statute leaves plenty of room for
local alternatives that advance both peace and the goals of international criminal justice. 145 These goals, in her 146
view, are retribution,
deterrence, expressivism and restorative justice.
Once Keller finds the room she needs in the language of the
statute, she proceeds to set out principled guidelines for deferral. In
essence, if an alternative justice mechanism such as a truth and reconciliation commission or a traditional justice process meets the
goals of international criminal justice better than the ICC, the ICC
should defer. 147 The strength of Keller's approach is that by relaxing
both the ICC Statute and the meaning of justice, she diffuses the
peace versus justice dilemma as it would surface in many instances.
But, though her framework puts forth a broad notion of justice, she
offers no way for ICC judges to conceptualize and accommodate the
demands of peace.
D.

Envisaginga Broader Concept ofPeace

Neither Keller nor Blumenson broadens the concept of peace
in the same way they broaden notions of justice. Both scholars are
seeking the optimum model of justice for a particular context. What
is missing from their articles, and from the literature generally, is an
account of the concept of peace that is on par with the richer concept
of justice they are innovating, a concept with the potential to help an
ICC judge managing the peace versus justice dilemma.
The Nuremberg Declaration's definition of "sustainable
peace" is a promising start. According to this semi-official UN document:
Sustainable peace goes beyond the signing of
an agreement. While the cessation of hostilities, restoration of public security and meeting basic needs are
urgent and legitimate expectations of people who have
been traumatized by armed conflict, sustainable peace
requires a long-term approach that addresses the struc144. Keller, supra note 14, at 211 (2008).
145.

Id. at 237-51.

146.

Id. at 213.

147.

Id. at 259 62.
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tural causes of conflict, and promotes sustainable development, rule of law and governance, and respect
for human rights, 148
making the recurrence of violent
conflict less likely.
This multifaceted definition of peace includes short- and long-term
ends. It assumes that the rule of law and respect for human rights
will help make peace sustainable. Rather than putting peace and justice at odds, it requires peace-builders (including government officials, local leaders, aid groups, negotiators and judicial actors) to coordinate their interventions toward a broad, shared goal. What was
once the peace versus justice dilemma is forthwith transformed into a
question of timing and nuance: when and how should justice be done
to promote sustainable peace?
The Nuremberg Declaration is a good place to start to conceptualize peace, but it does not go on to operationalize its concepts.
49
Recently, a White House policy paper took a step in this direction.1
The paper makes concrete recommendations for U.S. action aimed at
achieving peace in Northern Uganda. 150 Its practical agenda exemplifies a concept of peace that, through its nuance, transcends the intellectual struggle so far associated with the peace versus justice dilemma within the international justice movement.
The authors of the U.S. strategy have a desired end-state in
mind as well as a preferred approach for achieving it. In this endstate, the Lord's Resistance Army's ("LRA's") threat to civilians is
eliminated.151 Joseph Kony and his senior commanders are captured
and brought to justice. 152 The remaining LRA fighters are demobilized. 153 People displaced by the rebels return home and resume their
livelihood activities. Struggling communities are assisted, and their
basic humanitarian needs are met. 154 The report posits that the protection of civilians requires both the improvement of information
sharing about the vulnerabilities of the civilian population and the

148.

Nuremberg Declaration, supra note 112, at 4.

149.

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STRATEGY TO SUPPORT THE DISARMAMENT OF THE

LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY (Nov. 24, 2010), available at http://pulitzercenter.org/sites/

default/files/WhiteHouseLRAStrategy-opt.pdf.
150.

Id. at 8 20.

151.

Id. at 8.

152.

Id. at 9.

153.

Id.

154.

Id.
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modus operandi of the LRA, and the development of effective protection strategies likely to prevent and mitigate LRA attacks. The
House Committee's approach to apprehending Kony and his senior
commanders is to enhance logistical, operational and intelligence assistance in support of multilateral partners and to enhance and sustain
diplomatic efforts that promote multilateral military support in the
155
campaign against the LRA.
The policy paper makes clear that viewing peace as the
nonnegotiable end does not leave conceptions of justice on the cutting room floor. Rather, it allows for positive action on the part of
judicial actors, whereas an abstract debate on the comparative value
of peace and justice might mire effective peace building efforts. Part
of the U.S. strategy on this front is to support the ICC's intervention
to arrest and prosecute Kony and his senior commanders. 156 The
committee also recommends supporting trials by the War Crimes Division of the Ugandan High Court. 157 The report sets priorities
among its proposals for achieving peace: "the sustained military and
diplomatic cooperation of governments in the region to defeat Joseph
Kony and the LRA, coupled with strong support from the international community, remains the most critical component for success." 158 Meanwhile, "bringing these senior [LRA] commanders to
justice is a key component of creating a lasting peace in the region."' 159 The way the committee is using these terms as a unit suggests that in practice, justice and peace are not as severable as the abstract debate might lead one to believe.
The White House Policy Paper begins to set out a more nuanced relationship between peace and justice, but it stops short of describing the role of international judicial actors in advancing sustainable peace. Meanwhile, the scholarship of Payam Akhavan, the
McGill law professor who advised the Ugandan government on the
situation in the North, offers the ICC judges some important preliminary insights into how they might interpret the law in order to advance ongoing multidimensional attempts to achieve peace. 160

155.

Id. at 14.

156.

Id. at 13.

157.

Id.

158.

Id.

159.

Id.

160. Payam Akhavan, The Lord's Resistance Army Case: Uganda's Submission ofthe
First State ReIerral to the International Criminal Court, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 403 (2005)
[hereinafter Akhavan, Lords Resistance Army Case]; Payam Akhavan, Are International
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Akhavan's proposals are closely tied to his broader argument about
the role of international criminal prosecutions in promoting international order. 161
For example, Akhavan describes the government of Uganda's
self-referral to the ICC as a means of achieving peace in a historically
intractable conflict; 162 when the obvious tools for achieving peace
with the LRA repeatedly failed, the government hoped that the ICC
referral would "engage an otherwise aloof international community" 163 and mobilize it against its mercurial enemy. Akhavan views
the ICC intervention that followed as part of a coordinated multilateral peace initiative. For example, the ICC's scrutiny of the situation
in Northern Uganda threatened to make public the LRA's ties to the
Sudanese government and other backers; consequently, the LRA lost
much of its financial support and military aid. 164 Other accounts
suggest that the ICC intervention also made supporting the LRA riskier and prompted the Sudanese government to cooperate with the ICC
arrest warrants, 165 correlated with an increase in defections 166 and
forced the LRA to the negotiating table. 167 Akhavan concludes,
"[t]his recent willingness to negotiate [was] linked to the LRA's political isolation and military containment-both of which are linked
to the new context created by the ICC referral." 168

Criminal Tribunals a Disincentive to Peace?: Reconciling Judicial Romanticism wivith
PoliticalRealism, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 624, 625 (2009) [hereinafter Akhavan, Reconciling].

161.

Akhavan, supra note 125, at 7.

162.

Akhavan, Lord s Resistance Army Case, supra note 160, at 404.

163. Id.
164.

Id.

165. Nick Grono & Adam O'Brien, Justice in Conflict? The ICC and Peace Processes,
in COURTING CONFLICT'? JUSTICE, PEACE AND THE ICC IN AFRICA 13, 16 (Phil Clark &

Nicholas Waddel eds., 2008).
166. Nick Grono & Caroline Flintoft, The Politics ul Ending Impunity, in AEGIS TRUST,
THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW (2009), available at

http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/commentary/the-politics-of-endingimpunity.aspx; Krishanu Sengupta, Peace or Justice?: The Dilemma qf the International
Criminal Court, 3 LETHBRIDGE UNDERGRADUATE RES. J. 1 (2008), available at

http: /www.lurj .org/article.php/vol3 n I/criminal.xml#e46.
167. Brody, supra note 116; see also Tolbert, supra note 112, at I ("There are early
indications that the issuing of arrest warrants may strengthen motivations to negotiate.
There are also signs that the existence or threat of arrest warrants can spur parties to examine
a broader array of justice measures than might otherwise have been the case .... ").
168.

Akhavan, Lord's Resistance Army Case, supra note 160, at 404; see also VICTIMS'

RIGHTS WORKING GRP., THE IMPACT OF THE ROME STATUTE SYSTEM ON VICTIMS AND
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More generally, Akhavan argues that "'[r]ealism' is not
founded on the appeasement 169
of power, and ideals are not irrelevant to
'pragmatic' considerations."'
International criminal tribunals can
be an impetus to peace by "discrediting and containing destabilizing
political forces."' 170 Indictments, along with arrest and prosecution,
have served to stigmatize violent leaders, thereby undermining their
influence.' 7' Akhavan considers Slobodan Milo~evid's fall from
power a prime example: following indictments issued by the ICTY,
the Serbian people forced the internationally-marginalized
Milogevid
172
out of office, achieving peace without amnesty.
However, Akhavan's analysis suffers from some methodological flaws. It is anecdotal and selective. He provides no indicators
that would allow for systematic evaluation of when and how each investigation and prosecution advanced or undermined other initiatives
to achieve peace. Additionally, Akhavan's analysis is retrospective,
and as a result, some of the fact patterns he discusses are susceptible
to alternative explanations. Furthermore, he does not consider how
international judicial actors should fulfill their mandate when pressing forward represents an acute impediment to peace. Nonetheless,
Akhavan supplies persuasive preliminary evidence, corroborated by
others, that trials, in conjunction with other peace initiatives, can be
an incentive rather than a barrier to peace.
E.

Judicial Considerations

The suggestion that ICC judges should interpret the law in order to promote peace may seem to run against an entrenched dogma
held by some liberal jurists. 173 According to this dogma, justice requires a division of power where the legislature makes the law and
the judiciary applies it. When this division holds, we can be said to
AFFECTED COMMUNITIES (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.vrwg.org/VRWGDOC/2010_Apr

VRWGImpact of ICC on victims.pdf.
169.

Akhavan, supra note 125, at 10.

170.

Id. at 7.

171.

Akhavan, Lords ResistanceArmy Case, supra note 160, at 419.

172.

Akhavan, supra note 125, at 17-18.

173. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule (?f Law as a Law qf Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175, 1180 (1989); Thomas Paine, Common Sense, in COMMON SENSE AND OTHER
POLITICAL WRITINGS 3, 32 (Nelson F. Adkins ed., 1953) ("[I]n America the law is king. For
as in absolute governments the king is law, so in free countries the law ought to be king; and
there ought to be no other."), cited in Scalia, supra note 173, at 1176.
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live under the rule of law, not the rule of the king. To suggest that an
ICC judge should do anything other than impartially apply the law
threatens the legitimacy of the ICC. Adam Branch argues that the
fact that the ICC must take contextual political concerns into account
"puts into relief the limits to the ICC's capacity to realize justice and
174
the rule of law."'
There are two reasons, however, why it is not necessarily a
deviation from the liberal ideal to suggest that an ICC judge should
seek in his or her work to promote both peace and justice. The first
pertains to the nature of the ICC Statute and an ICC judge's mandate
under its terms. The Statute is meant to advance both aspirations.
Perpetrators should be punished, the preamble makes clear, in order
to put an end to impunity for atrocity crimes. 175 But ending impunity
is meant to serve, as its purpose, the promotion of peace and security. 176 If an ICC judge takes the preamble of the Statute seriously, it
invites-perhaps even requires-him or her 177 to look to the effects
of his or her decisions and evaluate
whether a particular decision
178
contributes to peace and security.
The second reason that this proposal does not transgress the
liberal ideal involves the crime of aggression itself, or rather, its
prosecution. The goal of prosecuting the crime of aggression, known
as the crime against peace in the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg, is first and foremost to promote peace. 179
Even if one concedes, as Blumenson does, that there is inherent value
in retribution, especially concerning political and military leaders
who plan, initiate and wage illegal wars against their neighbors, it
would be problematic to prosecute aggression if the prosecution itself
would further jeopardize international peace and security.
174. Adam Branch, Uganda's Civil War and the Politics of ICC Intervention, 21 ETHICS
& INT'L AFF. 179, 189 (2007), available at http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/-abranch/
Publications/Ethics%/"20and%/"20international%/ 20Affairs%/2021.2,%/"20Summer%/"202007-Branch.pdf.
175. Rome Statute, supra note 5, pmbl. ("Recognizing that such grave crimes threaten
the peace, security and well-being of the world...").
176.

Id. ("Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and

thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes...").
177. The ICC Prosecutor may also be under the same obligation. ICC Prosecutor Luis
Moreno-Ocampo has been outspoken in interpreting his mandate in this way. See Luis
Moreno-Ocampo, The International Criminal Court: Seeking Global Justice, 40 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 215, 221 (2008).
178.

Rome Statute, supra note 5.

179.

London Charter, supra note 31, art. 6(a).
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This is not to suggest that indictments should be dismissed
every time perpetrators, like the LRA leaders, threaten reprisals.
Juan M~ndez, former Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General
on the Prevention of Genocide, warns, "If the ICC is contemplated
simply as a lever, it will be undermined as some will expect it to be
turned on and off as political circumstances dictate." 180 Rather, the
task of ICC judges is to interpret the new prohibition on aggression
within the language of the ICC Statute to advance its retributivist and
expressivist 181 goals in such a way as to promote peace and security.
When making the empirical assessment of how the ICC intervention will interact with other institutional attempts to bring peace,
the judges should begin by understanding the conflict. The International Negotiation Program of the Harvard Program on Negotiation,
in consultation with a group of international justice experts, created a
promising "Conflict Assessment Tool" to help systematize this
task. 182 The tool guides the researcher, in this case an ICC judge and
his or her staff, to focus on vital aspects of the conflict. It is designed
to help judicial decision-makers 83 understand the actors (and their
relationships, positions and interests), the history of the conflict (including triggers and attempted solutions) and the "mythologies" surrounding the conflict to imagine the possible impact the ICC's case
may have on the ground.

180.

Mndez, supra note 13, at 6-7.

181.

Mark A. Drumbl,

ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 173 (2007)
("The expressivist punishes to strengthen faith in rule of law among the general public, as
opposed to punishing simply because the perpetrator deserves it or because potential
perpetrators will be deterred by it."); see also Mark Drumbl, The Push to Criminalize
Aggression: Something Lost Amid the Gains?, 41 CASE W. RES.J. INT'L L. 291 (2009).

182. Advancing International Justice, THE HARVARD INT'L NEGOT. PROGRAM,
http://www.internationainegotiation.org/research/projects/internationa]-criminal-court/82advancing-international-justice (last visited Oct. 7, 2011) (discussing "The Conflict
Assessment Tool") [hereinafter HARVARD INT'L NEGOT. PROGRAM]. Though Harvard's
International Negotiation Program has designed a tool specifically for ICC decision-makers
balancing peace and justice concerns, there is literature on conflict analysis that is also
relevant.

See, e.g., EVAN A. HOFFMAN, THE MEDIATOR'S HANDBOOK FOR DURABLE PEACE

(2010); ROXANE S. LULOFS & DUDLEY D. CAHN, CONFLICT: FROM THEORY TO ACTION (2d
ed.

2000);

BERNARD

S.

MAYER,

THE DYNAMICS

OF

CONFLICT

RESOLUTION:

A

PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE (2000); HUGH MIALL ET AL., CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT RESOLUTION,
PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND TRANSFORMATION OF DEADLY CONFLICTS (2d ed. 2005);
BERGHOF RESEARCH CTR. FOR CONSTRUCTIVE CONFLICT MGMT., PEACE AND CONFLICT
IMPACT ASSESSMENT: CRITICAL VIEWS ON THEORY AND PRACTICE (Alex Austin et al. eds.,

2003), http://www.berghof-handbook.net/articles/pcia /"5Fcomplete.pdf.
183.

Originally, the Office ofhe Prosecutor.
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When considering the impact that an ICC case will have, the
Conflict Assessment Tool can help an ICC judge identify and account for considerations such as
the moral hazard problem for national courts, the cost
externalization of national governments, the increasing costs of defection for actors involved in the conflict, the delegitimization of particular officials, the
emotional legitimization of certain parties, the role of
the ICC as a catalyst to domestic actors, and the potential for either stabilizing or destabilizing a given
situation. 184
The Conflict Assessment Tool and related materials developed by
conflict management scholars and practitioners can assist judges in
taking the concrete requirements of peace into account as they interpret the law.
The Conflict Assessment Tool, for example, can help ICC
judges recognize that the court is seldom the only institution working
to advance peace and security. Its primary contribution to a concerted peace-building effort is to investigate, prosecute and try the gravest crimes within its jurisdiction. Thus, when it comes to protecting
civilians from backlash by an indicted leader, the ICC judges should
resist pressure to permanently stop a substantively compelling case.
Juan M~ndez makes a persuasive claim that "[j]ustice contributes to
peace and prevention when it is not conceived as an instrument of ei1 85
ther and on condition that it is pursued for its own sake."'
With no independent enforcement machinery, the ICC is not
the best institution to protect civilians. As the Nuremberg Declaration on Peace and Justice makes clear, "[e]ach State has the primary
responsibility to protect its population from these crimes." 186 If the
state fails to protect its population from unscrupulous political and
military leaders in its midst, other institutions, like the Security
Council, are better positioned than the ICC judges to protect the civilians. This may, in rare cases, involve deferring the warrants for renewable twelve-month intervals under Article 16 of the ICC Statute
while attempting to broker peace.
If one or more of the permanent members of the Council is
committed, however, to preventing the deferral of the investigation or

184.

HARVARD INT'L NEGOT. PROGRAM, supra note 182.

185.

Mndez, supra note 13, at 6.

186.

Nuremberg Declaration, supra note 112, at 5.
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prosecution, and the court's decision to press on with the case would
have catastrophic effects, the Prosecutor also has a responsibility to
call off the case under Article 53, which identifies "the interests of
victims" as a reason to halt an investigation or prosecution. Because
the Prosecutor's Article 53 decision is reviewable by the pre-trial
chamber of the ICC, the judges may also be faced with the "interests
of victims" question. Only after considering less drastic means, such
as delaying the investigation or prosecution, should the judges contemplate interpreting the statute to stop the' 187
case. In Blumenson's
language, this is the "catastrophic exception.
Nor is the simple existence of parallel peace negotiation
enough to justify halting or delaying an ICC case, as Southwick, Lomo and Natsios seem to suggest. 188 An important factor a judge
should consider when evaluating if and how to harmonize the various
aspects of the case with parallel peace processes is the history of the
negotiations between the warring groups and the patterns of violence.
A pattern of failed negotiations does not necessarily spell the failure
of future negotiations, but it certainly requires caution by an ICC
judge considering whether and how to coordinate the timing of a
case.
Thus, for example, the Ugandan Government's history of
failed negotiations with the LRA militates against withdrawing or
holding back the court's intervention. The fact that the historical pattern establishes that the negotiations gave the LRA time to regroup
and rearm and were followed by reprisals against civilians is still
more reason for a judge to stay the course. In the context of Sudan,
so long as the arrest warrant against Ahmad Harun, Sudanese Minister for Humanitarian Affairs, was ignored in favor of a three-track
peace process including political negotiation, peacekeeping and humanitarian aid, there was little or no progress, and the plight of the
internally displaced people under Harun's control in Darfur deteriorated. Only after 2008, when Sudanese President al-Bashir was also
indicted, did the peace process gain traction, ultimately culminating
in an agreement and the relatively peaceable secession of South Sudan. 189 Indictments following wartime atrocities can become a sig-

187.

Blumenson, supra note 14, at 849.

188.

Southwick, supra note 115, at 113; ZACHARY A. LoMo, WHY THE INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL COURT MUST WITHDRAW INDICTMENTS AGAINST THE ToP LRA LEADERS:

A

LEGAL PERSPECTIVE (2006), http://www.refugeelawproject.org/press-releases/press-why
ICCmustwithdraw.pdf; Natsios, supra note 128; see also Mdndez, supra note 13.
189.

See Mdndez, supra note 13, at 4.

20111

JUDGINGAGGRESSION

nificant political impediment, clearing the way for more moderate
leaders. 190

Some commentators, notably David Lanz at the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy, have concluded that in Northern
Uganda the ICC presence was a beneficial factor for achieving peace
at the outset, but that the warrants eventually came to block a final
compromise. 191 Lanz proposes trading justice for peace in order to
seal a deal with the LRA. 192 His suggestion is for the UN Security
Council to defer the case under Article 16 of the Rome Statute if the
LRA agrees to demobilize. If the Security Council is not prepared to
do this, Lanz maintains that the Prosecutor should stop the case under
Article 53(2) of the Rome Statute, in the interests of justice. 193 This
decision would be reviewable by the ICC judges. Lanz would withdraw the warrants under the terms of the ICC Statute to avoid "un194
dermin[ing] the credibility of the ICC."
This is not the way that justice should contribute to peace.
For those who take retributive principles seriously, leaders who
commit massive crimes such as genocide should be punished because
what they did is wrong. Furthermore, "[flor justice to have an impact, the most important condition is that justice follows its own
rules, without interference and without being subject to political considerations."'1 95 To date, 117 States Parties to the ICC have agreed to
this proposition and committed to ensure that leaders who perpetrate
international crimes are removed from power and incarcerated.
Lanz's shortsighted approach would erode the general deterrent impact that the ICC was established to achieve and that Akhavan and
others have begun to document. 196 Furthermore, Lanz's approach
190. See, e.g., Akhavan, supra note 125, at 8 (using the former Yugoslavia as an
example).
191. See David Lanz, The ICC s Intervention in Northern Uganda: Beyond the
Simplicity qlfPeace vs. Justice 8 (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Working Paper,
May
2007), available at http://www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/
EC66215A0071F156C12573910051D06D-FullReport.pdf
192. Id. at 2, 6 ("As a peace incentive, the ICC should consider removing the threat
posed by the indictments in the eventuality that the LRA makes a credible and verifiable

commitment to laying down their arms.").
193. Id. at 2 (citing Rome Statute, supranote 5, art. 53(2)(c)).
194.

Id.

195.

Mndez, supranote 13, at 6.

196.

See supra notes 188 199 and accompanying text; see also Moreno-Ocampo, supra

note 177, at 217 ("In Colombia, the Rome Statute's provisions influenced legislation and
proceedings against paramilitary forces.

One of the most interesting achievements of the
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would undermine the ICC's expressive function by turning justice into another political expedient. Justice can be an element of a rich notion of peace, but the judges should not lose sight of the fact that it is
also an end in itself and that its effectiveness depends upon its consistent application.
This is not to suggest that judges should remain blind to the
attitudes of stakeholders as they interpret the law. In particular, the
judges should be attuned to the attitudes of survivors of past ICC
97
crimes and potential victims when adjudicating an aggression case. 1
As legal scholar Cass Sunstein argues, "in rare (but important) cases,
judges legitimately attend to outrage and its effects as a way of ensuring against futile or perverse outcomes."'1 98
It strengthens Sunstein's argument that the ICC Statute creates a special role for victims to be heard within the judicial process. 199 Under Article 64 of the Rome Statute, for example, "[t]he
Trial Chamber shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and is
conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses." In addition, the
Prosecutor's decision to halt a case in the interests of victims under
Article 53 of the Rome Statute is reviewable by the judges. 200 The
ICC Statute is unusual insofar as it requires judges to proactively
consider the interests of victims as they interpret the law. Who those
victims are and how to assess their interests, especially in the context
of the crime of aggression, will no doubt require careful reflection on
the part of the judges.
The question remains: should an ICC judge take consequentialist considerations into account explicitly or implicitly? This decision should be a factor of the provision(s) at issue. Under Article
53(1) and (2), for example, the ICC prosecutor can decline to investigate or call off an investigation or prosecution in "the interests ofjus-

Rome Statute is that armies around the world are adjusting their regulations to avoid the
possibility of committing acts falling under ICC jurisdiction.").
197. See Nuremberg Declaration, supra note 112, at 5 (recognizing role for victims in
peacebuilding, justice and reconciliation processes).
198. Cass Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges
Care?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 155, 155 (2007).
199. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 15(3) (permitting victims to appear before the PreTrial Chamber regarding Prosecutor's request to proceed with an investigation); see also id.
arts. 19, 43, 53, 54, 57, 64.
200.

Id. art. 53.

20111

JUDGINGAGGRESSION

tice. ' ' 20 1 Under Article 53(3), the pre-trial chamber of the ICC may
be called upon, or act upon its own initiative, to review the prosecutor's decision not to proceed. 20 2 Little guidance beyond this language
is given to the ICC prosecutor and judges apart from the requirement
that they take into account two contextual factors, the gravity of the
crime and the interests of victims. Drafted as it is, Article 53 is an
example of a provision that seems to invite an explicit explanation of
the decision to decline to investigate or to halt an ongoing investigation or prosecution. It can be contrasted with a provision of the ICC
Statute requiring a case to be excluded on jurisdictional grounds
when the accused did not commit the alleged crime on the territory of
a State Party and is not a national of a State Party. 20 3 In the latter
case, an ICC judge does not need to provide a consequentialist explanation for his or her decision.
F.

The Peace Versus Justice Dilemma in an Aggression Case

The peace versus justice dilemma can be expected to evolve
from these forms in the context of an aggression case. It will retain
many of the familiar dynamics but take on new elements as well.
This section forecasts how recognizable arguments will surface in an
aggression case. As with the other ICC crimes, the successful management of the peace versus justice dilemma in the context of the
crime of aggression lies in the sophisticated interpretation of the ICC
Statute and the Kampala outcome in light of the context in which the
court operates. 204 It also depends on the ICC judges retaining rich
and integrated concepts of peace and justice as they hear an aggression case.

201. Id. art. 53(1)(c) ("Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of
victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not
serve the interests ofjustice.").
202.

Id. art. 53(3)(a)-(b).

203.

Id. art. 12.

204. In a similar manner, Professor Mark Drumbl suggests that ICC judges and
prosecutors proceed with a "light touch," which he describes as "a gentle and flexible
understanding of complementarity that adumbrates qualified deference to the national or
local."

Mark Drumbl, Policy Through Complementarity: The Atrocity Trial as Justice, in

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE

(Carsten Stahn & Mohamed M. El Zeidy eds., 2011).

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

1.

[50:82

Prosecution of Aggression as a Hurdle to a Negotiated
Solution

What has become increasingly clear from the peace versus
justice debate to date is that amnesties are no longer an acceptable re205
sponse to ICC crimes committed by political and military leaders.
The danger of involving the ICC in matters of war and peace without
the possibility of negotiated amnesties is that the existence of international criminal accountability will harden international relations so
that negotiated solutions to armed conflicts are set back. Henry Kissinger, in Diplomacy, laments the disappearance of the limited cabinet wars of the Post-Napoleonic era where dispassionate experts put
idealistic impediments to negotiated solutions aside in favor of a realistic balancing of power. 20 6 The argument that criminal accountability makes trade-offs with indicted leaders less palpable and undermines the incentives for aggressors to negotiate a peace agreement
since they can expect to be arrested when the conflict ends reflects
Kissinger's concerns.
There are two reasons why this argument is not wholly persuasive. The first is that preliminary evidence suggests that in the
context of the other ICC crimes, and contrary to the expectations of
the proponents of peace negotiations and amnesty, the intervention of
the court can actually advance peace processes. 20 7 The second is that
the strategy of appeasing power and ratifying the subordination of
one nation to another in a peace agreement is both immoral and unsustainable. It is immoral because states should not reward aggressors and participate in establishing or enforcing an exploitative arrangement between peoples. It is unsustainable because a people
existing in an unjust and subordinate relationship with another will
await an opportunity to revolt.
Moreover, the appeasement of powerful aggressors has had
mixed results for the appeasers. Leaders disposed to resort to atrocity
crimes against their own populations and wars against others have
not proven to be the most reliable negotiating partners. The most
conspicuous example, of course, is Chamberlain's signing of the
Munich Agreement in 1938, conceding the Sudetenland to Nazi
Germany. 20 8 This emboldened Hitler, and, soon after, he invaded Po-

205.

See supra note 119 and accompanying text.

206.

HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 220 21 (1994).

207.

See supra notes 187-98 and accompanying text.

208.

See Neville Chamberlain, Speech to the House of Commons (Oct. 6, 1938) in
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land. More recently, the American and British strategy of rapprochement with Colonel Moammar Gaddafi has not successfully
stabilized Libya. Gaddafi continued to employ violence against civilians at home and abroad until he was stopped by a military coalition
intervening under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 20 9 It remains to be
seen whether the involvement of the ICC will steady Libya's transi-

tion to democracy or complicate

it.210

The question for an ICC judge in an aggression case is
whether and when he or she should make space for traditional diplomatic alternatives to criminal accountability such as a peace deal and
amnesty when confronted by aprimafacieaggression case. The answer from the early history of the ICC, set out above, is that the ICC
judge should only stop a substantively compelling case when a catastrophe is imminent (Blumenson's "catastrophic exception"), when
other institutional mechanisms to protect civilians and end a conflict
have failed (exhaustion of remedies) and where the ICC is the sole
impediment to a successful resolution.
It is the responsibility of the ICC's States Parties to ensure
that judges are not put in an untenable position due to failures of diplomacy. When negotiations are about to collapse, and the court becomes a threat to international peace and security, the Security Council has a mechanism under Article 16 of the Rome Statute to delay
the case for renewable intervals. If one or more of the permanent
members of the Council is prepared to prevent a deferral, and proceeding is in all probability going to block the resolution of the conflict, the prosecutor has a responsibility to call off the case under Article 53 of the Rome Statute, in "the interests of victims." Only after
considering less drastic means, such as delaying the proceedings,
should the judges contemplate interpreting the statute in such a way
to stop the case.

NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, IN SEARCH OF PEACE 212-218 (1939) (explaining justification for

1938 Munich Pact).
209. Kareem Fahim & David D. Fitzpatrick, Qaddafi's Grip on the Capital Tightens as
Revolt Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/23/world/
africa/23libya.html; Clifford Krauss, Qaddafi Plays Quietly, but He's Still in the Game, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 17,
1991, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9DOCE7D91F
3AF934A25750COA967958260.
210.

S.C. Res. 1970,

4 6,U.N.Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).
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Overlapping Domestic and International Responses

Where truth commissions and traditional justice rituals are
now challenging the ICC prosecutor and judges as they interpret the
Statute's complementarity regime, national responses to a state's own
alleged aggression, such as the UK's Chilcot Inquiry, are likely to
create uncertainty in the context of an aggression case. 211 The UK
Prime Minister and House of Commons established the inquiry in
2009 to "identify lessons that can be learned from the Iraq conflict. '212 Though the inquiry has investigatory powers and can question witnesses, its terms of reference, as set out by its Chairman, Sir
John Chilcot, nowhere mention criminal accountability. 213 Nor do
they preclude it. Under the ICC's complementarity regime, the United Kingdom could render an ICC intervention inadmissible by investigating and then deciding not to prosecute, so long as the national response is genuine. 214 A great deal, therefore, hinges on the way that
an ICC judge interprets the word "genuine."
An ICC judge should, in accordance with the Rome Statute,
take peace and justice into consideration when determining whether a
national response is genuine. Initiatives that successfully advance
utilitarian, deontological, expressive and restorative functions, even if
they do not result in the incarceration of leaders, should be evaluated
as more genuine than blanket amnesties for acts of aggression. 21 5 In
a context where coordinated institutional responses at the national
and international level are successfully advancing sustainable peace,
the ICC judges can relax their complementarity analysis slightly.

211.

About the Inquiry, supra note 83.

212.

Id.

213. Sir John Chilcot, Opening Statement 18 January 2011
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/news/20110118-opening-statement.aspx.

(Jan.

18,

2011),

214. Tolbert, supra note 112, at 3 ("Article 17 of the Rome Statute refers to the duty of
states to genuinely investigate or prosecute (if they seek to challenge admissibility), but it is
silent on the issue of punishment. Punishment tends to take different forms in different
societies. A few states have explored alternatives to amnesty, however, such as reduced
sentences in exchange for guilty pleas.").
215. This argument builds from Keller's proposal in the context of Northern Uganda.
Keller, supra note 14, at 265 ("If AJM [Alternative Justice Mechanisms] meet most of the
enumerated factors [retribution, deterrence, expressivism, restorative justice] to a significant
extent, or at least to the same extent as ICC prosecution, then they further this theory, and
the ICC should defer."). I would add that ICC judges should consider whether the official
response is likely to exacerbate the conflict or defuse it, for instance, by taking into account
the attitudes of victims.
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The Chilcot Inquiry, meanwhile, which was constituted to
make transparent and publicize the decisions that brought the United
Kingdom to war in Iraq and derive lessons for the future, is an attempt to satisfy utilitarian and expressivist goals, but it fails to fully
address deontological and restorative aims. No accountability for delinquent officials was contemplated within the inquiry's framework
and there was no plan to compensate victims. Punishment need not
have amounted to incarceration for it to be genuine. Official condemnation, administrative lustrations, bans from holding high office
and the compensation of victims are reasonable alternatives to incarceration when the act of aggression has ended, there is little chance
that it will recur, a rigorous investigation has taken place and the nation is attempting, through genuine official responses, to come to
terms with what happened and make amends to the victims. Though
the Chilcot inquiry is a promising model, under this framework, it
would have fallen short of satisfying the complementarity criteria of
the Rome Statute.
Under the Kampala outcome, the ideal is a domestic response
rather than an international one. The drafters hope that the existence
of an international court and an enforceable crime will encourage national initiatives to prevent or punish political and military leaders for
aggression. 216 As I have suggested elsewhere, "[h]ad aggression
been a prosecutable crime in 2003, Prime Minister Tony Blair-who
relied heavily on the legal advice of his attorney general-may have
never brought his country to war in Iraq without a Security Council
resolution authorizing him to do so. ' ' 2 17 If Blair had gone ahead anyway, in spite of legal advice that the invasion amounted to the crime
of aggression, he may have faced a domestic tribunal instead of an
inquiry. Though the Chilcot model would have fallen short, a slightly modified alternative may have sufficed.
3.

Reprisals Against Civilians

Just as political and military leaders indicted for genocide,
crimes against humanity and war crimes may threaten reprisals
against civilian populations under their control unless the warrants

216. William Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal
Court and NationalCourts in the Rome System o Justice, 49 HARV. INT'L. L. J. 53 (2008).
217. Noah Weisbord, Who Started the Fight?, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/5/04/opinion/04iht-edweisbord.html (last visited Mar. 20,
2011).
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are dropped, victorious aggressors may attempt to bully out an amnesty. The same game of brinksmanship that Sudanese President
Omar al-Bashir undertook with the ICC in response to the indictment
against him is likely to arise in the context of an aggression case as
well.
When it does, the Security Council will be lobbied, as it was
regarding Darfur, to consider whether to defer the process for renewable twelve-month intervals. If the Council does not defer the case,
the ICC prosecutor will be faced with the question of whether to stop
it under Article 53 of the Rome Statute "in the interests of justice"
and, under that rubric, in "the interests of victims. '218 If the prosecutor does so, it will be incumbent on the judges to make a decision
whether to interpret leeway in the ICC statute to make way for a political compromise that appeases the alleged aggressor and takes the
pressure off of the civilians under his control. If the early history of
the ICC is any indication, the default answer should be no, except in
the case of the "catastrophic exception. '219 The correct solution is to
protect the civilians, not withdraw the warrants.
4.

The ICC's Long-Term Efficacy

According to Henry Kissinger, the League of Nations was
discredited when the Axis powers began invading surrounding nations with no legal recourse 220 : "the values it extolled clashed with
the incentives needed to enforce it.' ' 221 The same disconnect between
the commitments of states and their will to follow through exists at
the ICC when it comes to an aggression case. The difference is that,
at the ICC, professional judges are in a position to interpret the Statute so as to safeguard the regime. This will not be an easy duty to
manage.
There are two ways that the ICC judges, in prosecuting an aggression case, could gravely undermine the court's efficacy. Both
begin with a powerful state attacking its neighbor. In the first scenario, the ICC launches a case against a powerful aggressor but is unable
to secure an arrest because its efforts are obstructed at every turn by
the defendant and his or her allies. This would undermine the ICC's

218. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 53.
219.

Blumenson, supranote 14, at 849.

220.

KISSINGER, supra note 206, at 21845.

221.

Id. at 244.
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credibility. In the second scenario, the ICC declines to hear a case
against a powerful perpetrator on legal grounds, knowing full well
that an arrest would be impossible at that time. This would compromise the ICC's objectivity.
The answer here resides, as it does elsewhere when the peace
versus justice dilemma arises, in the sensitive interpretation of the
law in light of external contingencies. Experience has shown that
even powerful leaders like Charles Taylor, Slobodan Milogevid and
Jean-Pierre Bemba can be unseated and brought to justice. Rather
than mechanically and blindly pursuing the case or devising a legal
pretext to pull out, the key to successful prosecution and trial is timing and judgment. Just as a fisherman reels in a ten-pound fish on a
five-pound line by letting out line when the fish darts away and
spooling it in when the fish approaches, a sensitive judge will proceed forcefully when he or she has the cooperation required to be effective and less vigorously when encountering resistance that threatens to snap the line.
The special jurisdictional regime for the crime of aggression
will certainly alleviate some of these legitimacy concerns, though it
gives rise to others. This "soft" consent based system does not capture states that are not members of the ICC treaty, such as the United
States, Russia, China, Iran and Israel. 222 Non-party states constitute
many of the states most likely to pose a challenge to the ICC's legitimacy by projecting force abroad. Even if they attack an ICC State
Party that has ratified the Kampala outcome, the leaders of these nonparty states are immune from ICC prosecution. This is different from
the other ICC crimes. The leader of a non-party state, for example,
that commits crimes against humanity on the territory of an ICC State
Party can be prosecuted in The Hague. 223
Furthermore, ICC States Parties that opt out of the aggression
amendments shield their political and military leaders from accountability. This opt-out mechanism is not available for the other ICC
crimes. As a result of this jurisdictional framework, ICC justice for
aggression is incomplete. Aggressors from states that have not
signed the ICC Statute or have signed and opted-out of the aggression amendments will be above the law.
Imperfect justice, however, is better than no justice at all.
This "soft" consent-based regime, by creating a patchwork of potential accountability, also insulates the ICC judges somewhat since they
222.

Kress & von Holtzendorff, supra note 45, at 1179 1217.

223.

Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 12(2)(a).
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only have to hear cases against the leaders of states that have accepted the court's jurisdiction over aggression. At the outset at least, this
will include those states dedicated to the ICC's success and exclude
many of the great powers whose projections of military force could
challenge the judges. The hope of proponents of the Kampala outcome is that, over time, the rule will become widely accepted and
even powerful states will face domestic constituencies, political processes and multilateral pressures that militate against its violation.
III. HARD CASES

The peace versus justice dilemma will retain familiar characteristics and also acquire new ones in the context of an aggression
case. Beyond deciding how to harmonize peace and justice aspirations in the case at hand, ICC judges will need to consider how the
precedents they set will contribute to world order. Their interpretations of the Kampala outcome will have implications for the national
security of states, and this will raise the ante in aggression cases.
Three hard cases that the judges are likely to face, which remain controversial in international law, are the scope of self-defense, the legal
status of humanitarian intervention and the character of an armed attack. This section will suggest ways that the ICC judges might decide these questions in order to advance peace and justice.
A.

The Scope of Self-Defense

Contemporary international law on the use of force derives
from a general prohibition contained in the UN Charter. 224 States are
expected to resolve their disputes by peaceful means. 225 Article 51 of
the UN Charter, however, reserves to states the "inherent" right to respond to an armed attack in self-defense until the UN Security Council takes measures to restore peace. 226 The legal question that arises
today is whether, in an age of weapons of mass destruction and highspeed delivery systems, a state must wait for an attack to have landed
224. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
225. Id. para. 3.
226. Id. art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security.").
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before responding in self-defense. The question became important in
the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq but was never adjudicated and
resolved at the time. 227 It is likely to be raised at the ICC in a future
aggression case.
To advance the goals of peace and justice, the ICC judges
should apply the Caroline test to distinguish aggression and selfdefense. The Caroline test charts a sensible course between the
countervailing dangers of an unreasonably restrictive rule that requires states to wait until they have been struck before responding in
legitimate self-defense and one that fails to meaningfully distinguish
the aggressor and the victim. A rule requiring states to wait until
they have been struck before defending themselves would be unjust
in an age where a first strike with weapons of mass destruction
threatens the survival of entire communities and small states. Meanwhile, there is an equally compelling danger in interpreting selfdefense broadly so as to include preemptive strikes 228 ; relaxing the
prohibition on first strikes to this degree would create a Zeno's para229
dox where states are tempted to preempt each other's preemptions.
Under the Carolinetest, a state need not wait for an attack to
have landed before responding in self-defense. The state invoking
the right must show, "[n]ecessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation. ' 230
In short, the attack must have been imminent and the response necessary and proportionate for it to qualify. 231 In addition, the UN Char227. L.F. Damrosch & B.H. Oxman, Agora: Future Implications o/ the Iraq Conflict,
97 AM. J. INT'L L. 553 (2003).
228. See, e.g., Tarcisio Gazzini, A Response to Amos Guiora: Pre-Emptive Sel/-Delence
Against Non-State Actors?, 13 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 25, 30 (2008) ("Pre-emptive selfdefence is deliberately future-oriented and loses its defensive character. . . . [I]t would
undermine the general prohibition on the use of force and ultimately pave the way to
unilateral and uncontrolled self-help.").
229.

See THOMAS C. SCHELLING,

THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT

207-29

(1980)

(describing the notion of reciprocal fear of surprise attack); Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Myth
of Preemptive Self De/nse 16 (Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Task Force Paper, 2002) ("The United
States can hardly wish to see an anarchic regime in which every state is entitled to initiate

the use of force against its adversaries in preemptive self-defense."); Henry Kissinger,
Beyond Baghdad, N.Y. POST, Aug. 11, 2002, at 24. See also Henry Kissinger, Our
Intervention in Iraq, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 2002, at A15 ("It is not in the American national

interest to establish preemption as a universal principle available to every nation.");
Weisbord, supra note 31, at 33.
230. Robert Y. Jennings, The Carolineand McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 89
(1938).
231.

Id.; see David A. Sadoff, A Question of Determinacy: The Legal Status of
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ter requires the state invoking the right of self-defense to report immediately any measures taken to forestall the attack and to desist
once the Security Council
manages to maintain or restore interna232
tional peace and security.
The Carolinetest is not the only legal test that the ICC statute
and the Kampala outcome will reasonably accommodate. There is a
sixty-year long debate among legal scholars about the scope of legitimate self-defense, and the ICC judges will be expected to understand its rhetorical dynamics and take positions within it.233 The definition of the crime of aggression (Art. 8 bis) is the starting point for
an ICC judge. The language of the definition, meanwhile, does not
explicitly distinguish between aggression and self-defense. Nor does
it distinguish between important variants that fall on the spectrum in
between, such as preventive, preemptive and anticipatory selfdefense. Under the definition, an ICC judge is expected to interpret
and apply a rule that is quite general. Any manifest violation of the
UN Charter amounts to an act of aggression. 234 There are two zones
of interpretation here that the ICC judges will be expected to fill
when assessing whether a particular act amounts to aggression or
self-defense: whether the act violates the UN Charter and whether
that violation is manifest. The most reasonable way to interpret the
first zone will be set out in this sub-part, and the "manifest" qualifier
will be discussed in the context of humanitarian intervention.
1.

A Blanket Prohibition on the Use of Force?
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is "[t]he starting point for any

examination of the law [of the use of force] ."235 The key legal ambi-

guity of the provision stems from the interpretation of the second half
of the article: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorialintegrity or

Anticipatory Self-Defense, 40 GEO. J. INT'L L. 523, 536 (2009).
232.

U.N. Charter art. 51.

233. See, e.g., DEREK W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009);
Stephen Schwebel, Aggression, Intervention and Self-Delense in Modern InternationalLaw,
R.C.A.D.I. 463 (1972);

IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY

STATES (1963).

234.

Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 8 bis, para. 1.

235.

CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 6 (3d ed. 2008);

see also YoRAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 85 (4th ed. 2005)
(describing Article 2(4) as "the pivot on which the present day jus ad hellum hinges").
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political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. '236 The way this
segment is interpreted affects how narrowly or broadly the prohibition on the use of force should be read and conditions the outcome of
a self-defense claim (as well as other claims, such as humanitarian
intervention, the protection of nationals abroad and hot pursuit).
The elements of the legal argument are captured in the classic
and opposing positions of Professors Hersch Lauterpacht and Derek
William Bowett. Lauterpacht's broad reading of the blanket prohibition on the use of force contained in Article 2(4) limits the scope of
self-defense:
Neither is the obligation not to resort to force or
threats of force limited by the words 'against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State'.
Territorial integrity, especially where coupled with
'political independence', is synonymous with territorial inviolability .... Thus a State would be acting in
breach of its obligations under the Charter if it were to
invade or commit an act of force within the territory of
another state, in anticipation of an alleged impending
attack or in order to obtain redress, without the intention of interfering permanently with the territorial in237
tegrity of that State.
In other words, any resort by one state to the use of force in selfdefense against another is within the scope of Article 2(4) and must
be justified by an exception to its general prohibition. 238 The principal exception 239 is Article 51's reservation of the "inherent right of
'240
individual or collective self-defence" following an "armed attack.
Not surprisingly, judges and scholars that view Article 2(4)'s blanket
prohibition broadly interpret Article 51's exception narrowly to require a completed "armed attack. '24 1 Because, on this view, the UN

236.

U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (emphasis added).

237. HERSH LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 154 (7th ed., 1952).;
see also BROWNLIE, supra note 233.
238.

See Christopher Greenwood, InternationalLaw and the Pre-emptive Use ql/Force:

Atkhanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq, 4 SAN DIEGO INT'LL. J. 7, 10 11 (2003).
239. See Sadoff, supra note 231, at 540-41 (observing that Article 51 is the "focal
point" for discussion of the right of self-defense).
240. U.N. Charter art. 51.
241. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 232 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua Case] ("The exercise of the
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Charter superseded any customary law that might have permitted the
use of force before an "armed attack" is complete, there is no room
for a state to exercise anticipatory self-defense.
Bowett disagrees with Lauterpacht. His narrow reading of the
second half of Article 2(4) leaves room for a right of anticipatory
self-defense rooted in pre-Charter customary international law:
Despite these reasons it is submitted that, the
phrase having been included, it must be given its plain
meaning. Moreover, to give it its plain meaning coincides with the limitations on the obligation of nonintervention which traditional international law recognizes. The rights of territorial integrity and political
independence have never been absolute ....

In our

view, therefore, invasion of territory necessitated by
the imminence of an attack from that territory, and
justified by the conditions governing the right of selfdefence under general international law, would not be
prohibited under Art 2(4).242
This narrow reading of the text of Article 2(4) has led some
commentators to conclude that the provision effects only a partial ban
on the use of force. 243 Further, to the extent a state must look to Article 51 to justify the application of defensive force, scholars taking a
narrow view of Article 2(4) generally argue that pre-Charter customary law included the right to exercise anticipatory self-defense and
' 244
that Article 51 incorporated that "inherent right.
Lauterpacht and Bowett's argumentative dynamic is especially important because it goes beyond self-defense to make room for
(or close off) many exceptions to the UN Charter's pivotal prohibi-

right of collective self-defense presupposes that an armed attack has occurred ....
"),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/6503.pdf;
see also Sadoff, supra note
231, at 550 (summarizing the "restrictionist" argument that states are only entitled to
exercise defensive force in response to an attack that has already occurred).
242.

BOWETT,supra note 233, at 152.

243. See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, Israel's Air Strike Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor,
77 Am. J. INT'L L. 584 (1983) (concluding that Israeli strike against Osirik reactor did not
compromise Iraq's territorial integrity or political independence and was not inconsistent
with the purposes of the UN; therefore, the strike did not violate Article 2(4) of the Charter).
Sadoffobserves that this is a minority view. Sadoff, supra note 231, at 10.
244.

See MYRES S. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM

WORLD PUBLIC ORDER:

THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 232-41

(1961); Schwebel, supra note 233, at 463; Sadoff, supra note 231, at 550.
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tion on the use
of force, including humanitarian intervention, dis245
cussed below.
Since the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945, international
lawyers have used Lauterpacht's argument to condemn, and Bowett's
argument to justify, a variety of uses of armed force that they expect
will further peace and/or justice. In 1946, following the destruction
of some of its war ships, the United Kingdom sent ships into the Corfu Channel to collect evidence and determine who was responsible.
Albania, claiming a violation of its sovereignty, brought the case to
the ICJ, which rejected the United Kingdom's argument that its incursion did not violate the territorial integrity or political independence of Albania. 246 Professor Christine Gray notes, "[t]he famous rejection of this argument by the ICJ has been interpreted in
fundamentally divergent ways, either as a complete rejection of the
narrow interpretation of Article 2(4) or as a more limited rejection of
the UK claim on the particular facts. '247 Lauterpacht and Bowett's
debate has persisted.
Each time the narrow reading of the prohibition on the use of
force has been put forward, the broad reading has been raised to rebut
it, and the argument has never been definitively resolved. 248 International tribunals and states have tended to favor Lauterpacht's interpretation of Article 2(4),249 but it would be premature to declare it authoritative. There are not many judicial decisions, the tribunals do

245. See T.D. Gill, The Temporal Dimension of Self-DeIence: Anticipation, Preemption, Prevention and Immediacy, 11 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 361, 363 (2006) ("Much
controversy has centred on whether the prohibition was intended to bar uses of force not
explicitly treated as exceptions in the Charter, such as humanitarian intervention and
national liberation struggles.").
246. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9) [hereinafter Corfu Channel],
available at http:// www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/1/1645.pdf
247.

GRAY, supra note 235, at 32.

248. The ICJ has declined to consider this question in the context of Article 51.
Nicaragua Case, supra note 241, 194.

See

249. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. 4, at 29-35; Considerations of a Complaint by Iraq,
U.N. SCOR, 2280 2288th mtgs. (1981); S.C. Res. 487, U.N. Doc. S/RES/487 (June 19,
1981); see also Mary Ellen O'Connell & Maria Alevras-Chen, The Ban on the Bomb-And
Bombing: Iran, the U.S., and the InternationalLaw qf Self-DeIense, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV.
497, 505 06 (2007) (observing that Israel advanced the broad interpretation to justify the
bombing of the as yet incomplete Osirak nuclear reactor, debating whether Israel's attack
constituted self-defense and concluding Israel's attack was in "clear violation" of the Charter
of the United Nations) (quoting S.C. Res. 487, 1111, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/487 (June 19,

1981)).
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not address the issue head on and the international bodies that condemn the use of force (the UN Security Council and the General Assembly) do not provide legal reasons for their resolutions. The ICC
judges, in contrast, adjudicating a criminal case in which a defendant's liberty is at stake, will have little leeway to obscure their interpretation of the law.
2.

Temporal Dimensions of the Self-Defense Exception

Another contentious provision of the UN Charter that the ICC
judges will be required to interpret when faced with a claim by the
defendant that his or her state used armed force in legitimate selfdefense is Article 51. According to the language of this article, the
right of self-defense is triggered by an armed attack. When an armed
attack has occurred, however, has historically been a matter of controversy. The controversy has temporal and qualitative dimensions.
The temporal question pertains to when the attack has begun,
thereby triggering the right of self-defense. The qualitative dimension, discussed in the next sub-part, pertains to the character of an
armed attack. The dominant position of international lawyers in relation to the temporal dimension of an armed attack is that an armed
attack need not have landed on the territory of a member state for the
right of self-defense to arise and for that state to respond with armed
force. 250 The question for a judge hearing an aggression case is
whether the use of defensive force is legitimate if it is (i) interceptive,
(ii) anticipatory and (iii) preemptive. Sadoff defines the categories in
this way 251:
Interceptive self-defense is characterized by
military action in response to an attack that has not actually crossed the defending State's sovereign borders,
but nevertheless has commenced ....
Anticipatory self-defense consists of the use of
force in "anticipation" of an attack when a State has
manifested its capability and intent to attack immi250. Elizabeth Wilnshurst, Principles of International Law on the Use of Force by
States in SelfDefense 4 (Chatham House, Working Paper No. 05101, Oct. 2005); see also
Mary Ellen O'Connell, supra note 229, at 8; DINSTEIN, supra note 235; Sadoff, supra note
231, at 530.
251. Sadoff, supra note 231, at 530. There is considerable difference of opinion
regarding terminology in the literature. See generally id. at 529 and authorities cited therein
at 529-30 nn.29-31.
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nently....
Preemptive self-defense stems from a fear that
in the near future, though not in any immediate sense,
a State may become an armed target of an aggressor
State. The notion is to "preempt" a potentially esca-

lating military threat ....

252

In his review of the legal authorities, Sadoff rightly concludes that interceptive self-defense is now "widely accepted in principle," though
"no modem day examples exist," 253 while preemptive self-defense
"has had virtually no legal traction. '2 54 Other international law
scholars who have surveyed the authorities agree. 255 It is anticipatory
self-defense, and the limits of this notion, that are more controversial
and, therefore, where an aggression case might turn.
Because the language of Article 51 specifies that the right of
self-defense only exists if an armed attack occurs, a judge at the ICC
considering including anticipatory self-defense in the provision
would need to read it in. There are two schools of thought among international law scholars on whether this can be done; each is based
on a distinct line of precedent. Everything turns on the first sentence
of Article 51 and the phrase, "[n]othing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right [French: droit naturel] of individual or collective self-defence. '2 56 This seemingly anachronistic phrase sparked
a sixty-year debate among legal scholars about the character and
scope of this right.
Hans Kelsen, writing in 1951, concluded, "the right has no

252.

Id. at 530-31.

253. Id. at 531. Depending upon how one interprets the facts, the Six Day War may
qualify as interceptive or anticipatory self-defense. See id. at 530 31 nn.31, 38 (rejecting
Dinstein's "unconventional" characterization of the 1967 Six Day War as interceptive selfdefense and observing that most scholars would classify the Six Day War as "invad[ing] the
province of 'anticipatory' self-defense."); DINSTEIN, supra note 235, at 192; see also MARYELLEN O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE:

CASES AND MATERIALS

280 (2d ed. 2009).
254. Sadoff, supra note 231, at 531; Tarcisio Gazzini, A Response to Amos Guiora:
Pre-Emptive SelfDeence Against Non-State Actors?, 13 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 25, 29
(2008).
255. See James Thuo Gathii, Assessing Claims of a New Doctrine of Pre-emptive War
Under the Doctrine of Sources, 43 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 67, 95 (2005), available at
http://www.vedegylet.hu/fejkrit/szvggyujt/gathii-preEmptiveWar.pdf;
O'Connell,
supra
note 229, at 2 ("Preemptive self-defense.., is clearly unlawful under international law.").
256.

U.N. Charter art. 51.
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other content than the one determined by Art. 51.1"257 Bowett rejoined, "[Kelsen's] is a fundamentally erroneous approach which
produces a restricted interpretation of the article not warranted by the
Charter. ' 258 The disagreement was never resolved and reached its
climax in the debate over the 2002 National Security Strategy of the
United States and the legality of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, with the
United States making the arguments espoused by Bowett.259 Despite
this active academic debate and interpretations set out by the ICJ and
other judicial bodies, some contend that the precedent has "become
increasingly irrelevant to governments making decisions in the stress'260
ful context of armed attack.
While the language of Article 51 limits self-defense to situations where an armed attack has occurred, legal authorities who
choose Bowett's reasoning over Kelsen's invoke the Caroline doctrine as the classic pre-Charter statement of the right of anticipatory
self-defense. 2 61 The Caroline doctrine originated in correspondence
between U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster and British Ambassador Henry Fox following a British incursion into the United States
that destroyed the Caroline, a ship being used by U.S. nationals to
supply Canadian rebels with arms and reinforcements. A successful
justification for the incursion, Webster and Fox agreed, would require the state invoking the right to show "[n]ecessity of self-defense,
instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment
257.

HANS KELSEN,

RECENT TRENDS IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

A

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 914 (1951).

258. BOWETT, supra note 233, at 185; see also McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note
242, at 232-41 (1961); J. STONE & B. BENJAMIN, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER: A
CRITIQUE OF UNITED NATIONS THEORIES OF AGGRESSION 44 (2006).
259.

AMERICA

THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF

15

(Sept.

2002),

available at

http://www.au.afmil/au/awc/awcgate/nss/

nss-sep2002.pdf ("For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an
attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present

an imminent danger of attack.").
260. Nicholas Rostow, Remarks in The Legacy of the Iraq War:
Impact on
International Law, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING (AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW) 215, 217 (2008); Michael J. Glennon, The Fog qfLav: Self-Dek nse,
Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 539 (2001) (concluding that Article 51 of the UN Charter has been so frequently
violated by states that it cannot survive as a guide to United States policymakers in the war
on terrorism); see also Michael J. Glennon, Terrorism and the Limits (fLaw, 26 WILSON Q.
Spring 2002, at 12 (noting the pitfalls of strict adherence to abstract legal constructs and the
need to balance law and legal theory with practical reality).
261.

See generally Sadoff, supranote 231, at 535 37.
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of deliberation." 262 In addition to being a response to an imminent
attack, the use of force must have been necessary and proportionate
("nothing unreasonable or excessive" 263) for it to qualify as lawful
anticipatory self-defense. 264 While the Caroline doctrine is more
specific than Article 51 of the UN Charter, it is also, arguably, broader because it permits the defensive use of force in response to an at265
tack that is merely anticipated and has not yet been launched.
Bowett's broad interpretation of Article 51 opens the door to a variety of controversial exceptions to the Charter's prohibition on the use
266
of force, of which anticipatory self-defense is but one.

The Carolinetest has been endorsed by important authorities
267
and criticized by others, creating contradictory lines of precedent.
The Nuremberg Tribunal applied the Caroline standard to analyze
the claim raised by some of the defendants that Germany had attacked Norway to forestall an Allied invasion and occupation of that
country. 268 The tribunal acknowledged that no treaty could take
away the right of self-defense and that each state was left to determine, in the first instance, whether immediate defensive action was
necessary to forestall an imminent danger. 269 "But that does not
mean," the judges concluded, "that the state thus acting is the ulti-

262. Letter from Daniel Webster, Secretary of State, to Lord Ashburton (July 27, 1842),
quoted in Jennings, supra note 230, at 89.
263.

Id.

264.

See GRAY, supra note 235, at 149.

265. See, e.g., Amos N. Guiora, Anticipatory Self-Deence and International Law A
Re-Evaluation, 13 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 3, 7 (2008) ("The Caroline Doctrine limits the
right to self-defence to situations where there is a real threat, the response is essential and
proportional, and all peaceful means of resolving the dispute have been exhausted. Article
51 of the UN Charter narrowed self-defence, making it permissible only in the event of an
armed attack.") (footnotes omitted).
266.

The defense of nationals abroad is another (e.g., the Israeli rescue at Entebbe

Airport in 1976).

See ALAN DERSHOWITZ, PREEMPTION: A KNIFE THAT CUTS BOTH WAYS

89 93 (2006).
267. See generally Terry D. Gill, The Temporal Dimension of SelfDelense:
Anticipation, Pre-emption, Prevention and Immediacy, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED
CONFLICT: EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES 125-28 (Schmitt & Pejic eds., 2007) (surveying the
scholarship on the Carolinecriteria).
268. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, Oct. 1,
1946, as reported in 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 205 (1947) (applying the Caroline test
verbatim).
269. Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, Volume 19, July 26, 1946, at 460-61, available at
bttp:Havalon.law.yale.edu/imt/07-26-46.asp.
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mate judge of the propriety and of the legality of its conduct. It acts
at its peril. Just as the individual is answerable for the exercise of his
common law right of defense, so the state is answerable
if it abuses
2 71
its discretion. ' 270 The Tokyo Tribunal followed suit.
The case law at the ICJ has done little to resolve the debate
over the Caroline doctrine because the judges have consistently decided cases pertaining to the use of force without recourse to the doctrine of self-defense. The ICJ, in Nicaragua, invoked the Caroline
test when evaluating the state of customary international law on the
use of force, but ultimately found that it did not apply to the case because the conflict was ongoing.2 72 The ICJ also took the requirements of necessity and proportionality, two of the three elements of
the Caroline test, into account in the Oil Platforms case. 273 In Oil
Platforms, the United States claimed self-defense to justify its attacks
on Iranian oil platforms, but the ICJ found that the original attacks on
the United States were not attributable to Iran. Nonetheless, the court
added in obiter that the U.S. attacks had not been necessary and pro274
portionate.
The ICJ rejected Uganda's self-defense claim in its case
against the DRC on a similar basis: the attacks Uganda was responding to were not attributable to the DRC. 275 Similarly, when Israel invoked self-defense to justify the construction of its security barrier,
the ICJ found that the threat was not from another state and concluded, "Article 51 of the Charter has no relevance in this case. ' 276 Rather than clarify the doctrine of self-defense, the ICJ seems to prefer
to decide use of force cases on the basis of the less contentious doc-

270.

Id.

271.

STANIMIR

A.

ALEXANDROV,

SELF-DEFENSE

AGAINST

THE

USE OF FORCE IN

INTERNATIONAL LAw 68-69 (1996).
272. Nicaragua Case, supra note 241; see also T.J. Farer, Nicaragua v. United States
(Merits), 81 Am.J. INT'L L. 77, 112 (1987).
273. Oil Platforms Case (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 ICJ Reports 185,
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/90/9715.pdf.
274.

Id.

73 77 (Nov. 6),

78.

275. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),
2005
I.C.J.
168,
11
146-147
(Dec.
19),
available at
http://www.icjcij.org/docket/index.php?pl 3&p2 3&code co&case-1 16&k 51.
276. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 139 (July 9) [hereinafter Israeli Wall Case],
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p l 3&p2 4&k=5a&case 13 1&code
mwp&p3=4.
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trine of attribution.
Meanwhile, critics of the Caroline standard cast doubt on its
relevance today, describing it as a political agreement brokered by
two states in an era when the sovereign right to wage war was barely
limited by international law. 277 Yoram Dinstein, an opponent of the

standard, adds, "[t]here was nothing anticipatory about the British action against the Caroline steamboat" since the relevant armed conflict was already in progress. 278 According to Gray, "[t]his episode
has attained a mythical authority. '279 O'Connell warns against "privileging one word ["inherent"] over the whole structure and purpose
of the UN Charter," which "specifically designated the Security
Council to meet threats to the peace, preserving the right of a state to
act unilaterally only in cases of armed attack. '280 An ICC judge adjudicating a grey-area aggression case where anticipatory selfdefense is alleged will need to resolve some of these historic ambiguities.
An ICC judge might reconcile an appeal to customary international law and the Caroline criteria with a strict reading of the text
of Article 51 by approaching the issue as one involving resort to canons of construction. For example, applying the rule generalia specialibus non derogant,281 a judge could conclude that where Article
51 is specific (for example, in requiring an armed attack) its terms
should prevail. However, where Article 51 is incomplete or silent
(for example, in failing to define an armed attack or identify the moment of its commencement), a judge might resort to customary inter282
national law (pre- and post-Charter) to supplement the text.

Although the discussion thus far has focused on interpreta-

277. The right was inseparable from the concept of self-defense and there was no ban on
the use of force. See Sadoff, supra note 231, at 528, 535. Because the Carolinedoctrine
was articulated while these concepts were developing, "critics question the formula's proper
contribution to shaping customary international law at all." Id. at 537; see also WILLIAM V.
O'BRIEN, THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR 132 133 (1981) (finding the Caroline

doctrine "more rhetorical than substantive" in effect); James A. Green, Docking the
Caroline:
Understanding the Relevance ?f the Formula in Contemporary Customary
InternationalLaw ConcerningSelf-Dl nse, 14 CARDOZO J. INT'L & CONTEMP. L. 429, 440
41(2006).
278.

DINSTEIN, supra note 235, at 184 85.

279.

GRAY, supra note 235, at 149.

280.

O'Connell, supra note 229, at 13.

281.

"The general does not detract from the specific."

282.

See Gill, supra note 245, at 364.
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tions of Articles 2(4) and 51 in isolation, a complete understanding of
the right of self-defense requires an examination of the Charter provisions as they relate to each other. 283 Articles 2(4) (prohibiting the use
of force), 2(3) and 33 (requiring the peaceful settlement of disputes),
and 43 et seq. (establishing a mechanism for ensuring collective security) "collectively were designed, to the extent possible, to promote
peace (even at the expense of justice) and accordingly to deter States
from engaging in hostilities, especially on a unilateral basis. '284 In
this respect, Joyner has observed that although the Charter sought to
achieve goals falling within the scope of "justice" (for example, ensuring human rights violations were not left unremedied), these goals
were not to be attained "at the expense of peace. ' 285 Thus, for Sadoff
and Joyner, these provisions are indicative of the Charter's "sharp focus on peace" 2 86 and strong preference for resort to nonviolent means
of dispute resolution. In this account, the enforcement of the Charter
provisions by the ICC judges against leaders who violate them is a
form of peacemaking through justice.
3.

Alternatives to the CarolineTest

There are reasonable alternatives to the Caroline test that an
ICC judge, in the interest of promoting peace and justice, might entertain. One is a strict standard requiring an attack to have landed to
justify a state's exercise of self-defense. A bright line rule of this sort
would inoculate the ICC against accusations of bias. So long as the
attack surpassed a de minimis threshold, whoever struck first would
be automatically deemed the aggressor.
In a marginally more flexible variant, a state could invoke the
right of self-defense in response to an attack that has commenced but
not actually crossed the defending state's sovereign borders. 2 87 Pro288
fessor Mary Ellen O'Connell favors these bright-line standards.
Referring to the Caroline test, Professor O'Connell asks, "why

283.

Sadoff, supra note 231, at 541.

284. Id. (citations omitted).
285.

CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY: RULES FOR

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 165 (2005), cited in Sadoff, supra note 231, at 541 n.88.
286.

Sadoff, supra note 231, at 541 n.88.

287. So-called interceptive self-defense. See DINSTEIN, supra note 235, at 182, cited in
Greenwood, supra note 238, at 14 n.31.
288.

OCJONNELL, supra note 253, at 8.
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should we want such a low, subjective threshold to killing?" 289
ICJ Judge Christopher Greenwood favors an interpretation of
the right of self-defense that is based on the Caroline test but is
somewhat broader. Greenwood argues that, while international law
does not require states to wait until it is too late to engage in selfdefense, it does not give a broad general license for preemptive military action either. 290 Under Greenwood's framework, a judge evaluating a self-defense claim, particularly one where the threat was imminent, would give special consideration to the gravity of the threat
and the manner in which it would materialize. 29 1 Self-defense
against a state or a non-state group in possession of weapons of mass
destruction, for example, would be permissible, even if the moment
292
of the attack remained uncertain.
Greenwood's flexible imminence threshold invites abuse
when applied by states themselves, who tend to favor their own causes, but his proposal is more reasonable when applied by an independent judicial institution in accordance with widely accepted rules of
evidence and procedure. When applied by the ICC judges, the doctrine provides checks and balances on the arbitrary use of military
force while incrementally accommodating new threats to the peace.
Checks and balances on the ICC judges themselves, such as requirements of the judicial method, pre-established rules of evidence and
procedure, the need to decide by majority holding, the transparency
of judicial decisions, the right of appeal and the Security Council
power under Article 16 of the Rome Statute to defer a case, just to
name a few, are insurance against judicial abuse of a flexible standard.
Professor Amos Guiora, on the other hand, completely rejects
the Caroline criteria and proposes a "strict scrutiny" approach that
would permit a state to act earlier against a non-state actor than international law presently allows, provided that the use of force is based
on "reliable, viable, valid and corroborated intelligence presented to a
court of law. '293 Under Guiora's proposal, "a President that acts in
contravention to the [domestic] court's ruling could be liable for
289. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Comment to Harold Koh on Targeted Killings,
EJIL:TALK! (April 19, 2010), http://www.ejiltalk.org/harold-koh-on-targeted-killings.
290.

Greenwood, supranote 238, at 36.

291.

Id. at 36-37.

292. See id. at 17 (stating that even the Caroline attack was not advanced by a state
actor but came from someone most would call a "terrorist" today).
293.

Guiora, supranote 265, at 3.
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committing a crime and possibly an impeachable offence. '294
Guiora's proposal has two weaknesses. First, it risks creating
a situation in states with a hawkish judiciary in which the foxes are
guarding the chicken coop. Second, and more fundamentally, it is a
non-starter under the terms of the Kampala outcome. Paragraphs 2
and 4 of the Elements of the Crime of Aggression preclude a leader
from successfully raising a domestic legal analysis authorizing the
295
use of armed force as a defense.
Ultimately, the original Caroline test provides a stronger basis for establishing and maintaining world peace than the alternatives.
Greenwood's standard fails to effectively stabilize expectations
among states possessing weapons of mass destruction. O'Connell's

narrow reading of the UN Charter is, in principle, unfairly restrictive.
Guiora's proposal may not provide credible oversight, and, at the
same time, it violates the terms of the Kampala outcome.
In contrast, the Caroline standard minimizes the Zeno's paradox problem by requiring proof of imminence, necessity and proportionality to establish the defense. 296 By permitting a case-by-case
analysis, the Caroline standard accommodates factors, such as "the
credibility and urgency of a specific threat, the consequences of suffering the incipient or probable attack and the availability, or lack
thereof, of feasible alternatives 297 to defensive action, that a brightline rule would exclude. The Caroline criteria likewise permit a
judge to interpret the imminence requirement reasonably, in light of
the circumstances, for example, by permitting a focus on factors such
as the "nature, purpose, and objective" of the response, rather than
primarily on the time that lapsed between the initial attack and the response. 298 Additionally, the Caroline test enjoys broad support
294.

Id. at 21.

295. Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, annex 1i;see also Gazzini, supra note 254, at 31
(arguing that domestic courts are "inherently incapable of relaxing international rules on the
use of force in self-defence and [the decision of a domestic court] cannot affect in any way
the legality of the military action under international law.").
296. Where the relevant conduct is a defensive first strike-as in the case of anticipatory
self-defense-establishing the elements of the defense will be challenging. With respect to
necessity, a state availing itself of the defense must show "that the external threat (including
the adversary's intention) is real and that peaceful means to resolve the crisis have been
exhausted." Sadoff, supra note 231, at 527. With respect to proportionality, "a State would
be left to speculate about the military plans and capabilities of an adversary when calibrating
its own non-excessive reaction to the threat posed." Id.
297.

Gill, supra note 245, at 362.

298.

See id. at 369.
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among the international legal community: a critical mass of international law scholars have endorsed it; both the Nuremberg and Tokyo
tribunals have cited it with approval; 299 and the language of Articles
2(4) and 51 accommodates it.
B.

The Characterof an Armed Attack

Physical territory and armed conflict are, for historical reasons, key concepts in the language of the UN Charter and GA Resolution 3314.300 When the Charter and Resolution 3314 were drafted,
armed attacks on territory were the most important method of war-

fare. 30 1 However, as information technology transforms the nature of
modern warfare, 302 ICC judges will find it necessary to consider
whether attacks that lack clearly defined physical boundaries-for
example, cyber attacks and systems disruption 30 3-should fall within
the scope of the crime of aggression. Professor Matthew Waxman
summarizes this "exercise in legal line-drawing" as follows:

299.

Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 16, at 205; see Sadoff, supra note 231, at 538

39.
300. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (prohibiting the "threat or use of force" in international
relations), art. 51 (reserving inherent right of self-defense following an "armed attack");
Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, art. 1, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR,
29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, 143, U.N. Doc. A/9890 (Dec. 14, 1974) (requiring "armed force");
G.A. Res. 3314, art. 3 (listing examples of acts of aggression requiring the deployment of
"armed forces"); see Sean P. Kanuck, Infbrmation Warfiare: Newl Challenges for Public
InternationalLaw, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 272, 288 89 (1996).
301. However, "[a] substantial body of states continued to press in the Special
Committee for inclusion of economic aggression in the [1974] definition." Julius Stone,
Hopes and Loopholes in the 1974 Definition qfAggression, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 224, 230
(1977).
302. See, e.g., Kanuck, supra note 300, at 290 (1996) ("It is both much easier and more
profitable to conduct information warfare against an adversary's knowledge resources than

to conduct a conventional war against its armed forces."); Matthew C. Waxman, CyberAttacks and the Use qf Force: Back to the Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE J. INT'L L. 420,

423 (2011) (noting there is "'growing consensus' that future conflict may feature 'the use of
cyber-warfare to disable a country's infrastructure, meddle with the integrity of another
country's internal military data, try to confuse its financial transactions or to accomplish any
number of other possibly crippling aims."' (quoting Press Release, John Chipman, Dir.-Gen.
& Chief Exec., Int'l Inst. for Strategic Studies, THE MILITARY BALANCE 2010 (Feb. 3, 2010),
available
at
http://www.iiss.org/publications/military-balance/the-military-balance2010/military-balance-2010-press-statement/)).
303.

Cyber attacks and systems disruption are, in fact, one phenomenon.
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The development and deployment of new technologies
-both their offensive potential and the vulnerabilities
they create for states reliant on those technologiesraise questions about permissible versus impermissible modes of interstate conduct and conflict. Military
attacks are generally illegal, with exceptions for selfdefense or when authorized by the U.N. Security
Council. Most economic and diplomatic measures,
even if they exact tremendous costs on target states
(including significant loss of life), are generally not
barred by the U.N. Charter, though some of them may
be barred by other legal principles. Where along the
spectrum of permissible to impermissible conduct do
30 4
various types of cyber-attacks lie?
The boundaries set by ICC judges could, if too broad, induce
more violence under the auspices of the right of self-defense. The
qualitative definition of what constitutes an armed attack must therefore straddle a fine line. It must be broad enough in its inclusion of
aggressive acts so as to provide adequate deterrence, but remain narrow enough so as to permit consistent adjudication. An interpretation
that captures a wider array of aggressive acts will also pose greater
challenges to the ICC judges, who will presumably be faced with
more cases in situations that have never before been adjudicated.
Despite the risks of an overbroad interpretation of armed attack, the term should nonetheless capture systems disruption causing
massive damage within the ambit of the crime of aggression. Such a
category has not yet been included within the scope of the UN Charter prohibition on the use of force by an official body. Excluding
systems disruption would, however, threaten the relevance of the
crime at a time when it is emerging as a common and potentially
devastating species of transnational political violence.
John Robb, the U.S. military planner who coined the term
systems disruption, defines it as the "sabotage of critical systems to
inflict economic costs on the target state. '305 I propose that the definition of systems disruption in the aggression context be narrower,
covering only massive damage to persons or property rather than emphasizing economic costs. Robb provides a number of examples
where a small group, with or without the assistance of traditional mil304.

Waxman, supra note 302, at 422.

305.

JOHN ROBB, BRAVE NEW WAR: THE NEXT STATE OF TERRORISM AND THE END OF

GLOBALIZATION 95

(2007).
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itary hardware, surreptitiously attacked a vulnerable point in a network (the "systempunkt") and caused massive damage. By impairing
the systempunkt, a small group can cause a "cascade of failure," amplifying the damage of an attack. 30 6 For example, a coordinated attack on the Russian Gazprom pipeline, backup pipeline and a high
voltage power transmission pylon in 2006 reduced Georgia to a preindustrial level for a week in the midst of a cold spell, putting the
lives of many vulnerable Georgians at risk.307 Robb's argument is
that, as the globe becomes more reliant on networks of all sortsinformation, energy, water, transport-vulnerabilities are created that
30 8
are being, and will increasingly be, exploited by aggressors.
Whether damage to a nuclear reactor is caused by a missile or a computer virus, is, in this context, beside the point, warranting parallel
treatment under the aggression rubric.
Expanding the concept of armed attack to include systems
disruption such as cyber-attacks is not without risks to peace and justice. The bright-line rule may become murky and fail to properly
guide behavior or fairly warn potential perpetrators about what behavior is impermissible. Destructive acts better left to domestic law
enforcement officials to address may become politicized international
issues if labeled as aggression, and this could destabilize international
relations. This is especially the case because systems disruptions that
involve computer networks are often disaggregated and difficult to
attribute to a single actor or group of actors as required for criminal
liability. 30 9 The disaggregated nature of the attacks increases the risk
that innocent people will be held accountable when a cyber-attack is
clandestinely routed through their computer, a typical way of launching cyber-attacks today. 310 Including systems disruption within the

306.

Id. at 98.

307. Id. at 94. For other examples, see id. at 99 (describing 2004 attack on Iraqi oil
pipeline), 103 (describing 2006 attack on water pipelines feeding natural gas plant in
Pakistan).
308. See also HOFFMAN, supra note 182, at 78 ("[A]s Danzig pointed out, armies are of
little use against such dangers, and neither the production nor delivery of such weapons
requires large, expensive systems. They are accessible to small groups or individuals, and
can hide under the radar.").
309. See Jonathan A. Ophardt, iBrief, Cyber Warare and the Crime of Aggression: The
Need/1br Individual Accountability on Tomorrow s Battlefield, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.
003,
19 (2010), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2010dltr003.
html.
310. Id. at 21 ("Infected computers scattered across the globe reportedly can be rented
for four cents a machine, providing the equipment needed for a DDoS attack to any paying
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ambit of "armed attack" also increases the risk that states will
misattribute cyber-attacks to other states and respond with traditional
3 11
military force in self-defense.
This ambiguity can be clarified or mitigated by clear judicial
limits on the term "armed attack," with particular concern for evidentiary thresholds. A method of discerning the evidentiary sufficiency
of a contentious case concerning the character of an armed attack is
important to the ICC's actions in this area. As I have argued elsewhere, to limit the scope of the term, only systems disruption, including cyber-attacks, causing massive damage akin to an armed attack,
should be included as an act of aggression. 3 12 Building on this idea,
the damage must be physical, to persons or property, of a transnational political nature and must be tantamount to a manifest violation
of the UN Charter. Consistent with Bowett's narrow view of Article
2(4) of the UN Charter, this last criteria means that the attack must
have, as one element, violated the territorial integrity or political independence of the victim state. Under this test, the effects of the attack are of particular significance, rather than the tools used to carry
it out. 313
The paradigmatic example of a systems disruption that would
qualify as an armed attack under this proposal is a cyber-attack
launched by the armed forces of one state against a nuclear reactor in
another state causing civilian deaths. When the act is not sufficiently
party for use against any desired target.").
311. See O'Connell, supra note 253, at 7 (the question of whether a state can be held
liable "where it failed to control the attacks" is potentially more difficult here).
312.

Weisbord, supranote 31, at 39.

313. Hoffman, supra note 182, at 77; e.g., National Research Council Committee on
Offensive Information Warfare, Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S.
Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities 32-36 (2009) [hereinafter NRC Committee
Report] (concluding that analysis of cyber-attacks under the Charter and jus ad bellum
should focus on whether the effects of the cyber-attack are tantamount to a military attack).
This effects-oriented reasoning has been adopted by influential scholars and experts. See
e.g., RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR:

THE NEXT THREAT TO

NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT 178 (2010); Abraham D. Sofaer et al.,

Cyber Security and InternationalAgreements, in Proceedings of a Workshop on Deterring
CyberAttacks: Informing Strategies and Developing Options for U.S. Policy 179, 185
(2010), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record-id=12997&page=179;
Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Self-De/knse Against Computer Network Attack Under
International Law, 76 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INT'L L. STUD. 121, 140 (2002); Michael
N. Schmitt, ComputerNetwork Attack and the Use q/Force in InternationalLaw : Thoughts
on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 885, 914-15 (1999); Waxman,
supra note 302, at 431.
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attributable to a state-the defacing of pictures of Georgian President
Mikheil Sakaashvili on Georgian government websites may be an
example-the attack does not amount to an armed attack under the
test. 314 When the damage is not physical, such as when websites are
defaced, the attack does not qualify either. If the attack does not undermine the territorial integrity or political independence of a state, it
does not trigger the right of self-defense. Though the attacks on
Georgia's websites were of a political character, they did not sufficiently undermine the political independence of the state and therefore should be excluded from the ambit of the crime of aggression.
These attacks were not tantamount to an invasion, a bombardment or
a blockade, enumerated acts in the definition of aggression. Aggressive acts by nationals of the victim state against their own state do
not fall within the ambit of "armed attack" either, unless they can be
attributed to another state. 315 The ICC judges will need to be satisfied that the prosecutor has met the strict evidentiary burden to prove
attribution. There are three ways that an ICC judge choosing to include systems disruption within the ambit of the crime of aggression
might do so: (1) the crime of aggression can be interpreted in light of
the 1974 GA definition which forms a part of it, (2) the acts listed in
article 8 bis can be incrementally expanded by analogy or (3) the
word "armed" can be interpreted broadly to include any tool capable
of disrupting a system and causing massive damage to persons or
property. The last mechanism is the most promising.
1.

Interpreting the Armed Attack in Light of GA Resolution
3314(1974)

Systems disruption can be included within the ambit of the
crime by interpreting aggression in light of the seven acts enumerated
in the 1974 GA definition: (1) invasion, (2) bombardment, (3)
blockade, (4) attacking another state's armed forces, (5) contravening
an agreement to station forces in another state (e.g., by refusing to
leave), (6) offering one's state as a launching ground for another state
to attack a third state and (7) sending armed bands to attack another
state. The Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression set314.

See Ophardt, supra note 309, at 6.

315. See Antonio Cassese, The Nicaragua and Tadi Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ
Judgment on Genocide in Bosnia, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L., 649, 649 68 (2007) (discussing the
Nicaragua and Tadi tests for establishing attribution for governmental and quasigovernmental
actors),
available
at
http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/18/4
/649.full.pdf+html
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tied the contentious question of whether the list was open or closed
by building
in what some participants termed "constructive ambiguity. '316 Thus, under the language of the Kampala agreement, which
stipulates, "any of the following acts ...qualify as an act of aggression," it is left to the judges to decide whether this list is comprehensive or illustrative. 317 Under the language of the GA definition, as interpreted at the Kampala conference, a judge could reasonably decide
to expand the definition of the crime of aggression to include a cyberattack.
Further support for this interpretive leeway may be found
within the original 1974 GA definition. Article 4 clarified: "The acts
enumerated above are not exhaustive and the Security Council may
determine that other acts constitute aggression under the provisions
of the Charter. '318 Although only Articles 1 and 3 of the 1974 GA
definition were ultimately incorporated in the Aggression amendments, they were included with the crucial caveat that the acts shall
be interpreted "in accordance with United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974."319
A judge interpreting the list of acts in light of the 1974 GA
definition may, in this way, open the list to systems disruption. The
weakness of this approach is that the complexity of the interpretation
may make a judge undertaking it appear to be biased, pressing for a
particular outcome through circuitous reasoning. In fact, this reasoning is an attempt to achieve an outcome, but an appropriate outcome
for an ICC judge, one that advances the goals of peace and justice rather than the interests of a particular nation. This interpretation is informed by a forward-looking approach to world order that seeks to
deter and punish massively destructive acts of transnational violence.
2.

Expanding the List of Acts of Aggression by Analogy

This is the least promising avenue of the three. By expanding
the acts listed in 8 bis by analogy, the ICC judges may, for example,
320
interpret a cyber-attack as an invasion or a denial of service attack
ICC-ASP, supra note 10, 47, ICC-ASP/6/SWGCA/INF. 1.
317. Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, annex I, art. 8 bis, para 2.
316.

318. G.A. Res. 3314/75, art. 4, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/9890 at 143 (Dec.
14, 1974) (emphasis added).
319. Rome Statute, supranote 5, art. 8 bis, para 2.
320. A "denial of service" attack is one calculated to eliminate access to significant
information networks; for example, "flooding an internet site, server, or router with data
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as a blockade. 321
322
There are three problems with this interpretive approach.
First, Article 22(2) of the ICC Statute explicitly prohibits extending
the crimes by analogy. 323 Second, not every systems disruption will
fit cleanly within one of the enumerated acts in 8 bis. Finally, analogizing systems disruption to the enumerated acts does not answer the
requirement of an "armed attack" contained in the definition.
3.

A Broad Reading of Armed Attack

The best approach for a judge wishing to include systems disruption within the ambit of the crime, therefore, is to interpret the
word "armed" broadly to include any tool capable of disrupting a
system and causing massive damage. A paradigmatic example of an
armed attack of this sort is a computer virus launched by the military
of a state against the air traffic control systems of another, causing
airplanes to crash, killing civilians. Within this interpretive framework, the computer that launched the attack is the armament. For an
attack to qualify, the damage should be physical, to persons or property, of a transnational political nature and must be tantamount to a
manifest violation of the UN Charter.
While this interpretive approach has the advantage of including new and increasingly important forms of transnational aggression, and it accords with the moral sentiment that intentionally destructive behavior is blameworthy whether accomplished with a
missile, a computer virus, or a biological virus, the risk is overreach.
The term "armed attack" should not, for example, encompass economic aggression such as domestic oil embargoes which disrupt
transportation systems abroad, or it will invite retaliation in selfdefense, thereby destabilizing expectations in the international system rather than stabilizing them. The judges, however, can answer
the overreach critique by clearly limiting the doctrine to the circumrequests to overwhelm its capacity to function." Waxman, supra note 302, at 423.
321. E.g. Kanuck, supra note 302, at 289 ("[T]he imbalanced ownership of
telecommunication satellites and other network devices worldwide would permit certain
developed nations in effect to impose an information embargo on other countries, at least
temporarily. Such unilateral action clearly resembles a naval blockade of foreign ports ...
."). In light of the "crippling effects" of an information embargo such as the foregoing,
Kanuck would consider the act one of aggression. Id.
322.

Weisbord, supranote 31, at 40.

323.

Rome Statute, supra note 5, art.
22, para. 2.
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stances described above.
C.

The Legal Status of HumanitarianIntervention

Ever since the 1999 NATO intervention to prevent ethnic
cleansing of Kosovar Albanians by Slobodan Milogevi6's forces, the
status of humanitarian intervention under international law has been
at issue. In spite of ample warning that atrocities were about to occur, 324 no Security Council authorization to use force and prevent the

impending catastrophe was forthcoming due to Russian and Chinese
opposition.325 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in his annual address to the UN General Assembly in September 1999, asked two
questions that cut to the core of the issue:
To those for whom the greatest threat to the future of international order is the use of force in the absence of a Security Council mandate, one might ask,
not in the context of Kosovo but in the context of
Rwanda: if, in those dark days and hours leading up
to the genocide, a coalition of States had been prepared to act in defense of the Tutsi population, but did
not receive prompt Council authorization, should such
a coalition have stood aside and allowed the horror to
unfold?
To those for whom the Kosovo action heralded
a new era when States and groups of States can take
military action outside the established mechanisms for
enforcing international law, one might ask: is there
not a danger of such interventions undermining the
imperfect, yet resilient, security system created after
the Second World War, and of setting dangerous precedents for future interventions without a clear criterion
to decide who might invoke these precedents and in

324.
REPORT:

See THE INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON Kosovo, THE Kosovo
CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED (2000)

Kosovo REPORT]; SAMANTHA POWER,

A

[hereinafter

PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF

GENOCIDE 443-73 (2002).

325. See generally

PEACE

AND

GOVERNANCE

PROGRAMME,

KOSOVO

AND

THE

CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (Albrecht Schnabel & Ramesh Thakur eds.,

2000) [hereinafter UNU
/kosovo full.htm.

Kosovo REPORT],

available at http://archive.unu.edu/p&g
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what circumstances?
In the context of the debate over the legality and legitimacy of
the Kosovo intervention, the values of peace and justice were once
again comingled and sometimes confounded. Justice could not possibly require the strict application of a limited use of force doctrine
that precluded the rescue of the Kosovar Albanians from preventable
genocide. Franck asks, "While consistency of application is an element in law's legitimacy, what benefit can a legal order derive from
becoming an accomplice to moral depravity?" 327 Nor should justice
be attainable only by violating the UN Charter. It would be absurd to
define peace as the absence of international military intervention
while Milogevid's forces massacred the Kosovar Albanians. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo (The Goldstone
Commission) concluded, "the NATO military intervention was illegal but legitimate. ' 328 NATO's unauthorized aerial bombing of Milogevi4's forces may have been legitimate, but it was not peace either.
The realists' portrayal of the peace versus justice dilemma in
the context of humanitarian intervention, the dominant depiction in
U.S. foreign policy circles, is unacceptably shallow. Justice is equated with an armed humanitarian response in violation of state sovereignty aimed at stopping violence by a government against its own
people. 329 Peace is equated with the preservation of territorial sovereignty and the balance of power. 330 Even Franck falls prey to this
3 31
shallow depiction of peace and justice.
Surely, it is misguided to equate the world's inaction in the
face of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo with peace. But calling a blatant
violation of the UN Charter just is problematic as well. The con-

326.

U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 4th plen. mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.4 (Sept. 20, 1999).

327.

THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE To FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND

ARMED ATTACKS 182 (2002).

328. KoSovo REPORT, supra note 324, at 4 ("It was illegal because it did not receive
prior approval from the United Nations Security Council. However, the Commission
considers that the intervention was justified because all diplomatic avenues had been
exhausted and because the intervention had the effect of liberating the majority population of
Kosovo from a long period of oppression under Serbian rule.").
329. See Henry A. Kissinger, Op-Ed, American Intervention: Somalia: Reservations,
WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1992, at C7; HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, MACHIAVELLI'S VIRTUE xii
(1998); REINHOLD NEIBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY (2001).
330.

FRANCK, supra note 327.

331.

Id. at 14 19.
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demnation of political and military leaders for mass violence against
their own people or others abroad by an impartial tribunal in accordance with widely accepted and authoritatively enacted rules is a more
defensible, if perhaps an unduly procedural, understanding of justice.
Peace should consist of international as well as intra-national peace;
justice should include accountability for pre-defined acts of aggression that violate international criminal law without a legally accepted
justification. The ICC judges should include a limited right of humanitarian intervention as one such justification.
There are good reasons, however, to be skeptical of states that
claim to be deploying armed force for humanitarian motives. Bass
reminds us, "The worst imperialists often claim they are acting from
the finest motives. '332 Franck and Rodley note, "[in] very few, if
any, instances has the right [of humanitarian intervention] been asserted under circumstances that appear more humanitarian than selfinterested and power-seeking. ' 333 The potential for abusing the humanitarian justification is significant. 334 Intervening states have, in
the past, imposed conditions that were not chosen by the beneficiaries of the humanitarian action. 335 Humanitarian interventions have
exacerbated international and internal conflicts. 336 A United Nations
University Report on the NATO intervention warns, "Any possible
arguments that NATO might become a guarantor of stability in Europe ... have lost their relevance and seem completely inappropriate

332. GARY J. BASS, FREEDOM'S BATTLE: THE ORIGINS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
15(2008).
333. Thomas M. Franck & Nigel S. Rodley, Afier Bangladesh: The Law of
HumanitarianIntervention by MilitaryForce, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 275, 290 (1973).
334. LouIs HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 144-45 (2d ed.
1979); OSCAR' SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 123-25 (1991);
Bryan F. MacPherson, Limited HumanitarianIntervention, 7 INT'L LEGAL THEORY 59, 65
(2001); Ian Brownlie, Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
AND THE UNITED NATIONS 139, 147-48 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973); qf Nicholas Onuf,
Humanitarian Intervention: The Early Years, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 753, 755 (2004)
("Responding to great harm, calls to action on humanitarian grounds draw much of their
power from a concern for what is good. Questions of right and wrong, of rights and redress,
are secondary."). But see Nicholas Tsagourias, Humanitarian Intervention and Legal
Principles,7 INT'L LEGAL THEORY 83, 85 (2001) ("Even if the concepts of human rights and
humanitarianism are 'bound to be abused', one could equally argue that sovereignty and
non-intervention are 'bound to be abused' by those committing human rights abuses or
genocide.").
335.

SCHACHTER, supra note 334, at 123 25.

336.

Id.
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[for Russia].

' 337

The same report also notes, "China is worried that

what happened in Yugoslavia yesterday could occur tomorrow in
Asia, especially in China, whose minority and human rights policies
are always criticized by the United States and its allies. '338 A countervailing critique is that states rarely use force for humanitarian aims
against great powers, creating an imbalance that some consider un339
just.
The most promising way to reconcile peace and justice is to
carve out a limited right of humanitarian rescue with robust safeguards against abuse by powerful nations attempting to use humanitarian arguments as a pretext for territorial and economic expansion.
According to Professor Nicholas Wheeler, "What is important, then,
is to distinguish between power that is based on relations of domination and force, and power that is legitimate because it is predicated
on shared norms. ' 340 In an international legal regime that functions,
in Franck's depiction, as a jury of political actors, a principled outcome based on the values of peace and justice, rather than so many
competing national interests, may or may not be forthcoming. 341 But
with the advent of the ICC and a definition of aggression accepted by
consensus by its Assembly of States Parties, a principled reconciliation of peace and justice in the context of impending humanitarian

337.

VLADIMIR BARANOVSKY, Russia: Reasessing National Interests, in Kosovo AND

THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 325, at 105.

338.

ZHANG YUNLING, China: Whither World Order After Kosovo?, in Kosovo AND

THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 325, at 117.

339. See, e.g., MacPherson, supra note 334, at 64 (observing that "intervention is an
asymmetrical right" that "will mostly be employed by the powerful states against weaker
states, and will seldom be employed against strong states, irrespective of the magnitude of
their human rights violations," but arguing that "[t]his inequality, while regrettable, does not
require that interventions should be rejected when they will be useful."). But see Tsagourias,
supra note 334, at 84 ("[T]he promulgation of the non-intervention norm is essentially a
matter of interests ....
The determination whether [the interests of smaller states] are more
important and take precedence over the interests of more powerful states (the definition of
what is a weak, small or large and powerful state is elusive) is subjective and a matter of
preference."). Franck's retort: "It is no argument that states willing to intervene in Kosovo
may not be equally willing to intervene in Chechnya or Tibet. Such inconsistency
demonstrates little but states' sensible tactical realism. The ultimate test of a humanitarian
intervention's legitimacy is whether it results in significantly more good than harm, not
whether there has been a consistent pattern of such interventions whenever and wherever
humanitarian crises have arisen." FRANCK, supra note 327, at 189.
340.

Nicholas J. Wheeler,

SAVING

STRANGERS:

INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 2 (2000).

341.

See FRANCK, supra note 327, at 186-87.
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catastrophes is now possible. The ICC judges are in a position to
weigh humanitarian justifications for the use of force in accordance
with predefined international law, settled rules of evidence and procedure, and institutional checks and balances.
There are three ways that an ICC judge might, through legal
interpretation, exclude a genuinely humanitarian intervention from
the ambit of the crime of aggression. 342 The judge might: (1) fit the
use of armed force into one of the existing exceptions to the UN
Charter's blanket prohibition, namely collective security or selfdefense; (2) apply a doctrine of mitigation such as the one proposed
by Thomas Franck; 343 or (3) interpret article 2(4) of the Charter narrowly, in accordance with Bowett's reading, 344 and determine that the
use of armed force was not a "manifest" violation. 345 The second and
third ways are the most promising.
1.

Humanitarian Intervention as Collective Self-Defense

Of the six instances of humanitarian intervention since World
War 11,346 two states, India and Tanzania, attempted to justify their
interventions by classifying them as self-defense. 347 India repeatedly
warned the United Nations that the Pakistani counter-insurgency operations in East Pakistan had reached a scale tantamount to genocide
before invading East Pakistan and effectively ushering its secession
and transformation into Bangladesh. 348 In its appeal to the UN General Assembly, India categorized the refugee flows from East Pakistan as a form of "civil aggression" that was as damaging as a mili-

342. In all three interpretive frameworks, the burden should be on the defendant to
prove the defense that the use of armed force fits within the humanitarian exception. Cf.
Bertram S. Brown, HumanitarianIntervention at a Crossroads',41 WM. & MARY L. REV.

1683, 1686 (2000) ("Those who rely upon the right of humanitarian intervention have a
responsibility to define its legal parameters.").
343.

FRANCK, supra note 327, at 174 91.

344.

BOWETT, supra note 233, at 152.

345. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 8 bis.
346.

Thomas Franck would add Vietnam to the states having employed the self-defense

argument in the context of a humanitarian intervention. FRANCK, supra note 327, at 145 51.

Vietnam's arguments were less clearly articulated, however, so I exclude its justifications of
self-defense. See id. at 150.
347.

SCHACHTER, supra note 334, at 123 25.

348. U.N. SCOR, 26th Sess., 1606th mtg. at 16, para. 167 (Dec. 4, 1971), in FRANCK,
supra note 327, at 140.
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tary assault. 349 India did not exclusively rely on its self-defense justification but also presented two other legal arguments. It claimed that
Pakistan was committing genocide in violation of the 1948 Genocide
Convention and that the Bengalis had a right to self-determination
under international law. 350 Consequently, the Security Council and
General Assembly both called for a cessation of hostilities and the
withdrawal of armed forces without condemning India for aggression. However, without an authoritative body to weigh India's legal
claims, it is unclear which ones succeeded and failed. As such, India's intervention does not provide determinate guidance for ICC
judges today.
Of Ugandan Field Marshall Idi Amin's atrocities against his
own people and border incursions into Tanzanian territory, it was the
latter that served as the justification for Tanzania's massive military
occupation of Uganda and overthrow of Amin. According to Professor Oscar Schachter, "Tanzania claimed self-defense rather than a
right of humanitarian intervention. '351 Franck considers it noteworthy that "Tanzania, to the extent that it made any effort to justify its
use of force, relied on a right of self-defense against Ugandan aggression and not on Amin's egregious offenses against humanitarian law
and human rights, even though "self-defense," under Article 51,
could not possibly justify the disproportionate Tanzanian reaction to
a relatively minor border provocation. '352 Franck's observations include an important warning for an ICC judge wishing to exclude a
genuinely humanitarian intervention from the ambit of the crime of
aggression. For a humanitarian intervention to fit within the doctrine
of self-defense, it must meet stringent criteria, including necessity,
proportionality and reporting.
The advantages of the interpretive technique highlighted
above, primarily its structural preservation of the modem use of force
349. U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., 2003d plen. mtg. at 15, para. 165 (Dec. 7, 1971), in
FRANCK, supra note 327, at 141.
350. U.N. SCOR, 26th Sess. 1608th mtg. at 27, para. 262 (Dec. 6, 1971), in FRANCK,
supra note 327, at 140.
351.

SCHACHTER, supra note 334, at 124.

352. FRANCK, supra note 327, at 145. Proportionality is also important for Professor
Anthony D'Amato in the context of humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. See Anthony
D'Amato, There is No Norm of Intervention or Non-Intervention in International Law, 7
INT'L LEGAL THEORY 33, 37 (2001) (classifying humanitarian intervention by bombing "an
absurdly blunt instrument," but concluding that intervention was evidence of "a moral
revolution in human civilization" that the international community should applaud and
improve).
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regime (a blanket prohibition with the exception of collective security and self-defense), is offset by its weaknesses. This technique can
stretch the concept of self-defense beyond credibility. Furthermore,
the legal fiction that refugee flows are tantamount to an armed attack
only relates to adjoining states, which may not be inclined to intervene to protect a neighbor's vulnerable populations. Though neighboring states are often interested in maintaining a stable neighborhood, they are also usually invested, for self-interested reasons, in the
affairs of adjoining states. A state's self-interested motive for intervening, sometimes difficult to distinguish from other justifications, is
a disqualifying factor in the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.
Beyond its humanitarian motives, for example, India had a security
interest in splitting Pakistan and East Pakistan and establishing an allied regime on its border. However, it is more difficult to challenge a
humanitarian intervention as pretextual when it is orchestrated by a
coalition of states with negligible confounding vested interests beyond the humanitarian rescue.
2.

Mitigation

A second, and better, interpretive technique that would allow
a judge to exclude a genuinely humanitarian intervention from the
ambit of the crime of aggression involves employing a doctrine of
mitigation such as the one proposed by Franck. 353 The doctrine of
mitigation has the advantage of preserving the integrity of the current
use of force regime while allowing for exceptions when a strict application of the rule would undermine peace and justice.
According to Franck, "the essence of mitigation is that the
law recognizes the continuing force of the rule in general, while also
accepting that, in extraordinary circumstances, condoning a carefully
calibrated and justifiable violation may do more to rescue the law's
legitimacy than would its rigorous implementation. ' 354 Franck, like a
number of other scholars, 355 recognizes that humanitarian intervention has been used as a pretext for self-interested states to accomplish
prohibited political or military aims rather than humanitarian ends.
His doctrine, if applied in a limited way by an independent judicial
body like the ICC, has the advantage of offsetting these concerns
while leaving some flexibility to protect vulnerable populations from
353.

FRANCK, supra note 327, at 174-91.

354.

Id. at 185.

355. See FRANCK, supra note 327.
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massive atrocities committed by their own governments. Franck argues that applying a doctrine of mitigation in cases of purely humanitarian intervention is also in the interest of international law. International law searches for a method to "bridge any gap between its own
institutional commitment to consistent application of formal rules and
the public sense that order should not be achieved at too high a cost
in shared moral values. '356 Applying the doctrine of mitigation can
help accomplish the goal of consistency while also providing protection for the world's most vulnerable populations.
To apply the doctrine of mitigation, an ICC judge must decide
whether an intervention violates the UN Charter and then whether
this intervention is justified. An ICC judge applying the doctrine of
mitigation would find the NATO intervention in Kosovo, for example, to be a violation of the UN Charter since it was not authorized by
the UN Security Council or conducted in self-defense. The judge
could then introduce the doctrine into the analysis in either of two
ways: he or she could determine that the violation was justified because it prevented a greater harm (e.g., an imminent genocide in Kosovo in violation of the 1948 Genocide Convention), or he or she
could emulate the court in United States v. Holmes and reduce or remit the sentence. 357 Both of these formulations of the doctrine fit
cleanly within the text of the Kampala outcome.
Regardless of which doctrine of mitigation the judges choose
to use, it is important for them to start with the threshold and contextual principles proposed in 2002 by the Independent International
Commission on Kosovo (the Kosovo Report). 358 These principles
356. Franck & Rodley, supra note 333, at 290; see also Jonathan E. Davis, From
Ideology to Pragmatism: China's Position on HumanitarianIntervention in the Post-Cold
War Era, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 217, 278 (2011) (recognizing China's frequent
argument "that humanitarian intervention is a pretextual tool of imperialism and hegemony,
cynically manipulated by self-interested great powers"); Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS
BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 144-45 (2d ed. 1979) (observing that humanitarian
intervention may serve as pretext for aggression); Ian Brownlie, Thoughts on Kind-Hearted
Gunmen, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 139, 147-48 (Richard
B. Lillich ed., 1973) ("Whatever special cases one can point to, a rule allowing humanitarian
intervention, as opposed to a discretion in the United Nations to act through the appropriate
organs, is a general license to vigilantes and opportunists to resort to hegemonial
intervention."); John Yoo, Fixing Failed States, 99 CAL. L. REv. 95, 105 (2011) (noting that
post-World War 1I, the international legal system considered intervention a pretext for
aggression).
357. 26 F. Cas. 360, (E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15383) (the crew of a sinking lifeboat
jettisoned passengers to save the majority), in FRANCK, supra note 327, at 179.
358.

KosovoREPORT, supra note 324, at 163-200.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[50:82

distinguish genuine from pretextual humanitarian intervention. According to the drafters of the Kosovo Report, there are two valid triggers for humanitarian intervention: (1) a severe violation of human
rights or humanitarian law on a sustained basis; or (2) state failure
subjecting civilians to great suffering and risk.359 When considered
applicable under one of these two triggers, the use of force must be
conducted with the direct purpose of protecting the civilian population, and, accordingly, the methods of the intervention must be calculated both to end the catastrophe as quickly as possible and to safeguard those civilians in harm's way. 360 Furthermore, the use of force
must be necessary; serious peaceful solutions must have been attempted before force is deployed, up to and including coercive
measures such as sanctions and embargoes. 361 Toward this end, significant attempts must have been made to acquire Security Council
362
authorization under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
Security Council authorization, however, is not dispositive of
a justification defense. If, for instance, the Security Council is
blocked from acting by one of the permanent members, it should not
necessarily preclude the defense. 363 Further guidance can be found in
sanctions from other authoritative bodies, such as the UN General
Assembly, or regional bodies like the Economic Community of East
African States (ECOWAS), as was the case in the 1989-1999 situation in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Arguably, however, the most important indication that intervention is justified stems from the manner
in which it takes place. It buttresses the defense if the intervention is
a time-limited, multilateral action divorced from territorial or economic goals and followed by robust humanitarian aid to a supportive
victim population. Though these criteria do not all need to be present
for the defense to succeed, most of them should be.
3.

The Manifest Qualifier in the Definition of Aggression

A third way for an ICC judge to exclude a genuinely humanitarian intervention from the ambit of the crime of aggression, the one
359.

Id. at 193.

360. Id. at 194.
361.

Id.

362.

Id.

363. See MacPherson, supra note 334, at 65 (arguing that Security Council's frequent
failure to promptly authorize an effective response to humanitarian crises "requires that
interventions be pernitted outside of the auspices of the Security Council").
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I consider the best, is to interpret Article 2(4) of the Charter narrowly, in accordance with Bowett's reading, and determine that the use
364
of armed force for humanitarian ends is not a "manifest" violation.
For example, an ICC judge could reason that because an intervention
was aimed at redressing pervasive human rights abuses (and therefore, upholds provisions of the UN Charter protecting human dignity), and further, because the intervention was not carried out in a
manner that impaired the territorial integrity or political independence of the state in which the intervention occurred (i.e., the character
of the act was genuinely humanitarian), the particular use of force
365
does not merit the imposition of criminal liability.
As the Kosovo Commission warned, "allowing the gap between legality and legitimacy to persist is not healthy. ' 366 For instance, the dissonance caused by the legal fiction that a humanitarian
intervention was conducted in self-defense inhibits solidarity with the
actual victims. 367 It draws the attention away from the plight of vulnerable people and to the credibility of the legal arguments, which
are sometimes tenuous. Similarly, while Franck's mitigation doctrine
is best at leaving the rule as clearly defined as possible, in doing so it
fails to acknowledge that the safety of civilians threatened by genocidal leaders is a matter of international law rather than a moral stipulation that mitigates it. Mitigation, as a doctrine, does not effectively
guide behavior.
Instead, finding that humanitarian intervention is not a "manifest" violation appears to be the path preferred by the drafters at
Kampala. Though there was no formal agreement on this point during the conference, the drafters of the aggression provision repeatedly
referred to humanitarian intervention as an example of the use of
armed force not reaching the de minimis threshold (i.e., "manifest"). 368 Furthermore, the definition of aggression was drafted in a
way that fits well with this final interpretive approach. The risk of
this third approach, of course, is that it will open the door to new and

364.

Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 8 bis.

365. c." James P. Terry, Rethinking HumanitarianIntervention Afier Kosovo: Legal
Reality and PoliticalPragmatism, ARMY LAW., Aug. 2004, at 36.
366.

Kosovo REPORT, supra note 324, at 186.

367.

See id.

368.

Stefan Barriga, Against the Odds: The Results o/ the Special Working Group on

the Crime of Aggression, in THE PRINCETON PROCESS ON THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION:
MATERIALS OF THE SPECIAL WORKING GROUP ON THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION, 2003-2009, at

9-10 (Stefan Barriga et al. eds., 2009).
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spurious justifications for the use of aggressive force. The solution is
for the judges to delimit the doctrine of humanitarian intervention
clearly using criteria such as the ones proposed by the Kosovo Commission.
How should an ICC judge applying this third interpretive approach determine what constitutes a "manifest" violation of the UN
Charter? Article 8 bis, paragraph 1 directs a judge to look to the
character, gravity and scale of the act of aggression. It is significant
that not every act of state aggression will attract individual criminal
accountability under the ICC's definition of aggression. Character is
a qualitative factor while scale is quantitative. Gravity has qualitative and quantitative dimensions, as a recent policy paper produced
by the Office of the Prosecutor explains. 369 Understandings 6 and 7,
interpretive guides that are part of the Kampala outcome that were
incorporated late in the Review Conference at the behest of the United States, were meant, according to the U.S. delegation, to allow
370
some scope for humanitarian intervention.
By clarifying, in Understanding 6, that aggression is "the
most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force; and that
the judicial determination whether an act of aggression has been
committed requires consideration of all the circumstances of each
particular case, including the gravity of the acts concerned and their
consequences," the United States sought, in spite of direct opposition
from the Iranian delegation, to exclude situations like Kosovo from

369. THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, POLICY PAPER
ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS 13 15 (Oct. 4, 2010), available at http://www.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/9FF 1EAA 1-41 C4-4A30-A202-174B 18DA923C/282515/OTPDraft
policypaperonpreliminaryexaminations04l0l.pdf;
see also Situation in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04-169, Judgment on the Prosecutor's appeal
against the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled "Decision on the Prosecutor's
Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58," 1 1 69-79 (July 13, 2006) (rejecting
"formulistic" criteria of gravity and a rigid legal bar to the interpretation of gravity,
reasoning that this might hamper the deterrent function of the ICC).
370. See Harold H. Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Statement at the Review
Conference of the International Criminal Court (Jun. 4, 2010) available at
http://www.state.gov/s/1/releases/remarks/142665.htm ("If Article 8 bis [the proposed crime
of aggression definition] were to be adopted ... understandings would need to make clear
that those who undertake efforts to prevent war crimes, crimes against humanity or
genocide the very crimes the Rome Statute is designed to deter do not commit 'manifest'
violations of the U.N. Charter within the meaning of Article 8 bis. Regardless of how states
may view the legality of such efforts, those who plan them are not committing the 'crime of
aggression' and should not run the risk of prosecution.").
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the ambit of the crime. 371 By adding, in Understanding 7, that character, gravity and scale must be read together when determining
whether a particular use of force was a "manifest" violation, and including the caveat, "no one component can be significant enough to
satisfy the manifest standard by itself," the United States sought to
raise the de minimis threshold still further and tailor the definition of
aggression to exclude the Kosovo precedent.
Certainly, if a judge determines that the "character" of the use
of force is humanitarian, this could serve to exclude Kosovo-like situations from the ambit of the crime. In addition, a judge has leeway
to decide that the "gravity" of an act of aggression is less if it is limited in scope and in time and conducted genuinely for the purpose of
protecting civilians from catastrophic harm. These criteria, combined
with the factors established by the Kosovo Commission, provide a
good template for a judge expected to distinguish whether the character of the attack is aggressive or humanitarian. The risk, of course, is
that Bowett's narrow reading of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, in
conjunction with the manifest threshold, will open the floodgates to
all sorts of bogus justifications for aggression. With the establishment of the ICC, however, for the first time in history, there is an international court to weed them out.
CONCLUSION

Hannah Arendt argued, in discussing the Eichmann trial:
"Not only does [the Eichmann court] not have at its disposal 'the
tools required for the investigation of general questions,' it speaks
'372
with an authority whose very weight depends upon its limitation.
More recently, Juan Mdndez maintained, "[j]ustice contributes to
peace and prevention when it is not conceived as an instrument of either and on condition that it is pursued for its own sake. ' 373 The insight of Arendt and Mdndez is that the authority and effectiveness of
a tribunal rests upon its fidelity to a legal process insulated from external considerations.
371. See Laurie O'Connor, Humanitarian Intervention and the Crime of Aggression:
The PrecariousPosition of the "Knights (#'Humanity," 2010 OTAGO Y.B. LEGAL RESEARCH
29; see also William A. Schabas, Kampala Diary 816110, THE ICC REVIEW CONFERENCE:
KAMPALA 2010 (Jun. 9, 2010), http://iccreviewconference.blogspot.com/ 2010/06/kampaladiary-8610.html.
372.

ARENDT, supra note 20, at 253 54.

373.

Mndez, supra note 13, at 6.
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The views of these scholars can be contrasted with those of
Cass Sunstein and Mark Drumbl, who envision an outward-looking
judge who takes account of context when interpreting the law. Sunstein argues, "in rare (but important) cases, judges legitimately attend
to outrage and its effects as a way of ensuring against futile or perverse outcomes. ' 374 Drumbl suggests that the ICC judges and prosecutors proceed with a "light touch," gently and flexibly deferring to
national or local initiatives when interpreting the ICC's complemen375
tarity regime.
For an ICC judge to successfully accomplish his or her mandate in the context of an aggression case where peace and justice are
at odds, he or she must build from the insights of both sets of scholars, finding a way to remain loyal to the legal process while taking
contextual factors into account. This will be no easy task. It will require skillful legal technique as well as insight into how the ICC's intervention is likely to interact with other peace-making initiatives.
The technical legal task is facilitated by the Kampala outcome
itself, which contains zones of interpretation that the judges are now
expected to fill, and the Rome Statute, which places the responsibility
on ICC judges to advance peace as they do justice. Accordingly, the
most important challenge the judges will face will be answering Arendt's challenge and proving that they have the tools to make legalpolicy decisions that advance peace in particular instances while, in
the long term, building the rule of law.
It is no small step to acknowledge that the ICC judges exercise discretion as they interpret the law. The danger is that a spell
will be broken and, with it, the law's claim to authority. But the
law's authority can be built-and squandered-in various ways.
Perhaps the most treacherous is for judges to deliberately remain
blind to context as they make decisions that undermine rather than
advance the law's purpose. The hope, meanwhile, is that the crime
of aggression, interpreted by a wise and far-sighted judge, will help
bring peace and justice into closer alignment so that efforts to
achieve one purpose successfully impel the other.
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